Publications
Publications
- March 2020
- Journal of Accounting Research
The Politics of M&A Antitrust
By: Mihir N. Mehta, Suraj Srinivasan and Wanli Zhao
Abstract
Antitrust regulators play a critical role in protecting market competition. We examine whether firms can use the political process to opportunistically influence antitrust reviews of corporate merger transactions. We exploit the fact that in some mergers, acquirers and/or targets are connected to powerful U.S. politicians that serve on the two congressional committees with antitrust regulator oversight. We find that merger parties with these connections receive relatively favorable antitrust review outcomes. To establish a causal link, we use plausibly exogenous shocks to firm-politician links and a falsification test. Politician incentives to influence merger antitrust review outcomes appear to be driven by lobbying, contributions, and prior business connections. In sum, our findings suggest that political interference affects the ability of antitrust regulators to provide independent recommendations about the anti-competitive effects of mergers.
Keywords
Political Economy; Antitrust; FTC; DOJ; Mergers and Acquisitions; Government and Politics; Power and Influence
Citation
Mehta, Mihir N., Suraj Srinivasan, and Wanli Zhao. "The Politics of M&A Antitrust." Journal of Accounting Research 58, no. 1 (March 2020): 5–53. (Previously circulated under title "Political Influence and Merger Antitrust Reviews.")