The Parable of the Auctioneer: Complexity in Paul R. Milgrom's <i>Discovering Prices</i>

Scott Duke Kominers; Alexander  Teytelboym

Article | Journal of Economic Literature | Forthcoming

The Parable of the Auctioneer: Complexity in Paul R. Milgrom's Discovering Prices

by Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Teytelboym

Abstract

Designing marketplaces in complex settings requires both novel economic theory and real-world engineering, often drawing upon ideas from fields such as computer science and operations research. In Discovering Prices, Milgrom (2017) explains the theory and design of the United States “Incentive Auction” that reallocated wireless spectrum licenses from television broadcasters to telecoms. Milgrom’s account teaches us how economic designers can grapple with complexity both in theory and in practice. Along the way, we come to understand several different types of complexity that can arise in market design.

Keywords: pricing; design; Auctions; Market Design; Complexity;

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Kominers, Scott Duke, and Alexander Teytelboym. "The Parable of the Auctioneer: Complexity in Paul R. Milgrom's Discovering Prices." Journal of Economic Literature (forthcoming).

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The Parable of the Auctioneer: Complexity in Paul R. Milgrom's Discovering Prices

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