The Parable of the Auctioneer: Complexity in Paul R. Milgrom's <i>Discovering Prices</i>

Scott Duke Kominers; Alexander  Teytelboym

Article | Journal of Economic Literature | Forthcoming

The Parable of the Auctioneer: Complexity in Paul R. Milgrom's Discovering Prices

by Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Teytelboym

Abstract

Designing marketplaces in complex settings requires both novel economic theory and real-world engineering, often drawing upon ideas from fields such as computer science and operations research. In Discovering Prices, Milgrom (2017) explains the theory and design of the United States “Incentive Auction” that reallocated wireless spectrum licenses from television broadcasters to telecoms. Milgrom’s account teaches us how economic designers can grapple with complexity both in theory and in practice. Along the way, we come to understand several different types of complexity that can arise in market design.

Keywords: pricing; design; Auctions; Market Design; Complexity;

Format: Print

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Citation:

Kominers, Scott Duke, and Alexander Teytelboym. "The Parable of the Auctioneer: Complexity in Paul R. Milgrom's Discovering Prices." Journal of Economic Literature (forthcoming).

This paper develops a class of equilibrium-independent predictions of competitive equilibrium with indivisibilities. Specifically, we prove an analogue of the “Lone Wolf Theorem” of classical matching theory, showing that when utility is perfectly transferable, any agent who does not participate in trade in one competitive equilibrium must receive her autarky payoff in every competitive equilibrium. Our results extend to approximate equilibria and to settings in which utility is only approximately transferable.

Hatfield and Kominers (2012) introduced a model of matching in networks with bilateral contracts and showed that stable outcomes exist in supply chains when firms' preferences over contracts are fully substitutable. Hatfield and Kominers (2012) also asserted that in their setting, full substitutability is equivalent to the assumption that all indirect utility representations of each firm's preferences are quasisubmodular; we show here that this claimed equivalence result does not hold in general. We show instead that full substitutability is equivalent to weak quasisubmodularity of all indirect utility representations.

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The Parable of the Auctioneer: Complexity in Paul R. Milgrom's Discovering Prices

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