Publications
Publications
- May 2019
- Review of Financial Studies
Marketplace Lending: A New Banking Paradigm?
By: Boris Vallée and Yao Zeng
Abstract
Marketplace lending relies on large-scale loan screening by investors, a major deviation from the traditional banking paradigm. Theoretically, participation of sophisticated investors in marketplace lending improves screening outcomes but also creates adverse selection. In maximizing loan volume, the platform trades of these two forces by choosing intermediate levels of platform pre-screening and information provision to investors. We use novel investor-level data to test these predictions. We empirically show that more sophisticated investors screen loans differently and systematically outperform less sophisticated investors. However, the outperformance shrinks when the platform reduces information provision to investors, consistent with platforms managing adverse selection.
Keywords
Marketplace Lending; Screening; Sophisticated Investors; Adverse Selection; Financing and Loans; Performance; Information
Citation
Vallée, Boris, and Yao Zeng. "Marketplace Lending: A New Banking Paradigm?" Review of Financial Studies 32, no. 5 (May 2019): 1939–1982.