The Role of Gatekeepers in Capital Markets

Suraj  Srinivasan; Sugata  Roychowdhury

Article | Journal of Accounting Research | May 2019

The Role of Gatekeepers in Capital Markets

by Suraj Srinivasan and Sugata Roychowdhury

Abstract

Gatekeepers in financial markets have the power to provide the institutional stability, fortitude and direction necessary for the development and the smooth functioning of capital markets. At the same time, they are often motivated by their own private incentives. This, along with the trade-offs they face and the at-times unintended consequences of the regulations they propose and enforce, can undermine their effectiveness. A thorough understanding of gatekeepers and their roles can thus illuminate academics, the financial community and regulators on how such gatekeepers can be the most effective and generate the greatest benefits for capital markets. Since gatekeeping roles and the literature they have inspired encompass a wide array of institutions and agencies, our overview concentrates on those that the conference papers appearing in this volume focus on. We conclude that collectively, the papers contribute to significant progress, point out some crucial areas that call for further investigation, and offer opportunities for future research.

Keywords: gatekeepers; Capital Markets; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Performance Effectiveness;

Format: Print

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Citation:

Srinivasan, Suraj, and Sugata Roychowdhury. "The Role of Gatekeepers in Capital Markets." Journal of Accounting Research 57, no. 2 (May 2019): 295–322.

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The Role of Gatekeepers in Capital Markets

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