Incentives for Public Goods Inside Organizations: Field Experimental Evidence

Andrea  Blasco; Olivia S. Jung; Karim R. Lakhani; Michael  Menietti

Article | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | April 2019

Incentives for Public Goods Inside Organizations: Field Experimental Evidence

by Andrea Blasco, Olivia S. Jung, Karim R. Lakhani and Michael Menietti

Abstract

Understanding why employees go the extra mile at work is a key problem for many organizations. We conduct a field experiment at a medical organization to study motivations for employees to submit project proposals for organizational improvement. In total, we analyze 1,237 employees, 118 proposals, and quality evaluations for more than 12,000 evaluator-proposal pairs. The analysis shows that solicitations offering a personal reward for top submissions boost participation rates without affecting submission quality. We show that this is due to workers partially internalizing the positive effects of their submissions on the other individuals in the workplace. We also find that offering employees project funding to implement their own proposals potentially backfires, undermining participation. And solicitations emphasizing mission-oriented goals, like improving patient care, are sensitive to the solicited person’s gender, with women responding more than men. These results shed light on the factors that drive employees’ engagement in organizational tasks, beyond regular duties, and provide insights on how to design incentives to foster contributions to public goods inside organizations.

Keywords: field experiment; innovation; contest; incentives; free-rider problem; healthcare organizations; Employees; Motivation and Incentives; Innovation and Invention; Organizations; Performance Improvement; Perspective;

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Blasco, Andrea, Olivia S. Jung, Karim R. Lakhani, and Michael Menietti. "Incentives for Public Goods Inside Organizations: Field Experimental Evidence." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 160 (April 2019): 214–229.

Incentivizing employees to engage with novel innovation mechanisms and contribute to collective problem-solving can be difficult. We run a field experiment with NASA (N=11,192) to study two widely used classes of non-financial incentives: recognition (of managers, peers, online platform participants), and the prospect of advancing the organizational mission. Our analysis shows that managerial recognition has a significant positive effect on employees’ engagement with the problem-solving platform. The other incentives are not found to be effective. A follow-up interview study suggests that (1) managerial recognition works through signaling the platform’s legitimacy in a context of uncertainty, as well as through offering managerial attention and appreciation; (2) recognition interacts with workers’ job proximity to the organization’s mission and can be particularly motivating for workers with distant job functions; (3) organizations where the appeal of the organizational mission is already strong may face difficulties in using the mission as an instrumental incentive.

Working Paper | HBS Working Paper Series | 2019

Engineering Serendipity: The Role of Cognitive Similarity in Knowledge Sharing and Knowledge Production

Jacqueline N. Lane, Ina Ganguli, Patrick Gaule, Eva C. Guinan and Karim R. Lakhani

We consider how the cognitive similarity between knowledge-sharing partners affects the knowledge-production process, namely knowledge transfer, creation, and diffusion. We theorize that knowledge production is systematically shaped by the field and intellectual similarity between knowledge-sharing partners’ disciplines of study and domain area interests. To estimate relationships, we designed and executed a natural field experiment at a medical symposium, in which exogenous variation was introduced to provide some of the 15,817 scientist pairs with opportunities for serendipitous, face-to-face encounters. Our data include direct observations of interaction patterns collected using sociometric badges, and detailed longitudinal data on the scientists’ publication records for six years following the symposium. We find both cooperative and competitive effects of cognitive similarity on knowledge production. While knowledge sharing increases the transfer of scientific concepts between scientists with some intellectual overlap, it reduces the diffusion of scientific knowledge between scientists from the same field. In contrast, cognitive similarity does not have a direct effect on knowledge creation, but we find that scientists who have initiated early-stage collaborations with one another are more likely to persist and publish together. The findings suggest that some cognitive similarity between knowledge-sharing partners can boost organizational knowledge production, but too much similarity may impede it.

Citation:

Lane, Jacqueline N., Ina Ganguli, Patrick Gaule, Eva C. Guinan, and Karim R. Lakhani. "Engineering Serendipity: The Role of Cognitive Similarity in Knowledge Sharing and Knowledge Production." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 20-058, November 2019. View Details

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Incentives for Public Goods Inside Organizations: Field Experimental Evidence

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