2020
Working Paper
HBS Working Paper Series

Are ISS Recommendations Informative? Evidence from Assessments of Compensation Practices

By: Ana Albuquerque, Mary Ellen Carter and Susanna Gallani

Format:Print
| Language:English
| Pages:54

Abstract

Using detailed information from the largest proxy advisor in the U.S., Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), we examine whether proxy advisors’ assessments of firms’ compensation practices are able to identify poor compensation practices as measured by subsequent performance. While prior research provides consistent evidence of an association between shareholder voting outcomes and proxy advisors’ Say-on-Pay recommendations, the evidence is mixed over whether their recommendations are informative about the quality of firms’ compensation practices. We find that ISS “Against” recommendations and negative assessments are associated with worse future accounting performance, consistent with ISS being able to detect low quality compensation packages. However, workload compression has an effect, as we find that the relation between assessments and future performance only occurs during the off season (i.e. for firms with non- December fiscal year ends).

Keywords

Proxy Advisors; CEO Compensation; Say-on-Pay; Institutional Shareholder Voting; Executive Compensation; Performance

Citation

Albuquerque, Ana, Mary Ellen Carter, and Susanna Gallani. "Are ISS Recommendations Informative? Evidence from Assessments of Compensation Practices." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 19-085, February 2019. (Revised March 2020.)