Publications
Publications
- August 2019
- American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Cadet-Branch Matching in a Kelso-Crawford Economy
By: Ravi Jagadeesan
Abstract
Sönmez (2013) and Sönmez and Switzer (2013) used matching theory with unilaterally substitutable priorities to propose mechanisms to match cadets to military branches. This paper shows that, alternatively, the Sönmez and Sönmez–Switzer mechanisms can be constructed as descending salary adjustment processes in Kelso–Crawford (1982) economies in which cadets are (grossly) substitutable. The lengths of service contracts serve as (inverse-)salaries. The underlying substitutability explains the unilateral substitutability of the priorities utilized by Sönmez and Sönmez–Switzer.
Keywords
Citation
Jagadeesan, Ravi. "Cadet-Branch Matching in a Kelso-Crawford Economy." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 11, no. 3 (August 2019): 191–224.
Supplemental Information
Online Appendix