Consequences of Debt Forgiveness: Strategic Default Contagion and Lender Learning

Gerardo  Pérez Cavazos

Article | Journal of Accounting Research | June 2019

Consequences of Debt Forgiveness: Strategic Default Contagion and Lender Learning

Abstract

I use a unique data set of loans to small business owners to examine whether lenders face adverse consequences when they grant debt forgiveness to borrowers. I provide evidence consistent with borrowers communicating their debt forgiveness to other borrowers, who then more often strategically default on their own obligations. This strategic default contagion is economically large. When the lender doubles debt forgiveness, the default rate increases by 10.9% on average. Using an exogenous shock to the lender's forgiveness policy, my findings suggest that as the lender learns about the extent of borrower communication, the lender tightens its debt forgiveness policy to mitigate default contagion.

Keywords: Debt Forgiveness; strategic default contagion; contracting; Borrowing and Debt; Communication; Learning;

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Pérez Cavazos, Gerardo. "Consequences of Debt Forgiveness: Strategic Default Contagion and Lender Learning." Journal of Accounting Research 57, no. 3 (June 2019): 797–841.

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Consequences of Debt Forgiveness: Strategic Default Contagion and Lender Learning

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