Husk Power: Scaling the Venture

Benjamin N. Roth; Joseph B. Lassiter III; Natalia  Rigol

Case | HBS Case Collection | December 2018

Husk Power: Scaling the Venture

by Benjamin N. Roth, Joseph B. Lassiter III and Natalia Rigol

Abstract

In January 2018, Husk Power had just raised $20 million to scale operations for a second time. From 2007 through 2013, Husk built 80 biomass waste (primarily rice husk from rice mills) plants that provided electricity to 250,000 villagers and shop owners spread across 350 villages in India and Africa.
By 2015, Husk underwent a major pivot. Rather than a rural electrification vision aimed at providing power to rural households through biomass gasification alone, Sinha envisioned plants organized around village commercial customers that used biomass gasification, solar energy, and battery power in tandem, allowing for power generation nearly 24-7. To bring this vision to reality, Sinha ceased operations of nearly all of the existing plant locations and began the conversion to new locations built around the “new” hybrid plant. Thus in 2015, Husk was operating a mere 10 power plants and serving roughly 2,000 customers, down from the 80 plants and roughly 250,000 customers they had prior to this shift.
After downsizing and reorganizing operations, was Husk Power once again ready to scale?

Keywords: scaling; Energy; Entrepreneurship; Emerging Markets; Growth and Development; Energy Industry; India;

Language: English

Format: Print

25 pages

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Citation:

Roth, Benjamin N., Joseph B. Lassiter III, and Natalia Rigol. "Husk Power: Scaling the Venture." Harvard Business School Case 819-069, December 2018.

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Husk Power: Scaling the Venture

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