Demand Estimation in Models of Imperfect Competition

Alexander  MacKay; Nathan H. Miller

Working Paper | HBS Working Paper Series | 2018

Demand Estimation in Models of Imperfect Competition

by Alexander MacKay and Nathan H. Miller

Abstract

We consider the identification and estimation of demand systems in models of imperfect competition. Under standard assumptions about demand and supply, the bias that arises from price endogeneity can be resolved without the use of instruments. We provide a constructive identification result where the causal price parameter can be expressed as a function of the covariance of unobserved shocks. The function is estimated efficiently by the output of ordinary least squares regression. Thus, with a covariance restriction on unobservable shocks, structural parameters can be point identified. Further, it can be possible to place bounds on the structural parameters without imposing a covariance restriction. We illustrate the methodology with applications to ready-to-eat cereal, cement, and airlines.

Keywords: demand estimation; identification; endogeneity bias; covariance restrictions; ordinary least squares;

Language: English

Format: Print

61 pages

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Citation:

MacKay, Alexander, and Nathan H. Miller. "Demand Estimation in Models of Imperfect Competition." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 19-051, October 2018.

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Demand Estimation in Models of Imperfect Competition

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