Patent Trolls: Evidence from Targeted Firms

Lauren  Cohen; Umit  Gurun; Scott Duke Kominers

Article | Management Science | December 2019

Patent Trolls: Evidence from Targeted Firms

by Lauren Cohen, Umit Gurun and Scott Duke Kominers

Abstract

We provide the first large-sample evidence on the behavior and impact of nonpracticing entities (NPEs) in the intellectual-property space. We find that, on average, NPEs appear to behave as opportunistic “patent trolls.” NPEs sue cash-rich firms and target cash in business segments unrelated to alleged infringement at essentially the same frequency as they target cash in segments related to alleged infringement. By contrast, cash is neither a key driver of intellectual-property lawsuits by practicing entities (e.g., IBM and Intel) nor of any other type of litigation against firms. We find further suggestive evidence of NPE opportunism: targeting of firms that have reduced ability to defend themselves, repeated assertions of lower-quality patents, increased assertion activity nearing patent expiration, and forum shopping. We find, moreover, that NPE litigation has a real negative impact on innovation at targeted firms: firms substantially reduce their innovative activity after settling with NPEs (or losing to them in court). Meanwhile, we neither find any markers of significant NPE pass-through to end innovators nor of a positive impact of NPEs on innovation in the industries in which they are most prevalent.

Keywords: Patent trolls; patents; innovation; Patents; Lawsuits and Litigation; Ethics; Innovation and Invention;

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Citation:

Cohen, Lauren, Umit Gurun, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Patent Trolls: Evidence from Targeted Firms." Management Science 65, no. 12 (December 2019): 5461–5486. (Cited in the United States Federal Trade Commission Report on Patent Assertion Entities, 2016.)

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Patent Trolls: Evidence from Targeted Firms

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