More from the Author

• Article | Strategic Management Journal | 2018

  Threat of Platform-Owner Entry and Complementor Responses: Evidence from the Mobile App Market

  Wen Wen and Feng Zhu

  We examine how app developers on the Android mobile platform adjust their innovation efforts (rate and direction) and value-capture strategies in response to Google’s entry threat and actual entry into their markets. We find that, after Google’s entry threat increases, affected developers reduce innovation and raise the prices for the affected apps. Once Google enters, the developers reduce innovation and increase prices further. However, app developers’ incentives to innovate are not completely suppressed; rather, they shift innovation to unaffected and new apps. Given many apps already offering similar features, Google’s entry may reduce such social inefficiency.

  Keywords: platform-owner entry; entry threat; innovation; complementors; mobile app industry; Technology Platform; Mobile Technology; Market Entry and Exit; Price; Innovation and Invention;

  Citation:

  Wen, Wen, and Feng Zhu. "Threat of Platform-Owner Entry and Complementor Responses: Evidence from the Mobile App Market." Strategic Management Journal 40, no. 9 (September 2019): 1336–1367.  View Details

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• Case | HBS Case Collection | April 2019 (Revised July 2019)

  Aperture Investors

  Krishna G. Palepu, George Serafeim and David Lane

  Aperture Investors is a startup investment firm that seeks to disrupt the asset management industry through competitive differentiation by charging investors primarily when its portfolio managers outperform the marketplace. Headed by Wall Street veteran Peter Kraus and backed with substantial and patient seed capital, Aperture seeks to attract both star portfolio managers and assets from mutual funds and hedge funds. Kraus believes that his innovative business model addresses the current dysfunctional fee and incentive structures in the industry, which have led to long-term market underperformance, and that Aperture will address the reasons that are motivating investors to shift to cheaper, passively-managed index and exchange-traded funds.

  Keywords: Business Model; Talent and Talent Management; Investment; Investment Funds; Asset Management; Recruitment; Selection and Staffing; Marketing Channels; Emerging Markets; Partners and Partnerships; Motivation and Incentives; Financial Services Industry;

  Citation:

  Palepu, Krishna G., George Serafeim, and David Lane. "Aperture Investors." Harvard Business School Case 119-053, April 2019. (Revised July 2019.)  View Details

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• Article | Harvard Business Review (website) | June 21, 2019

  When Tech Companies Compete on Their Own Platforms

  Feng Zhu

  One common complaint from third parties about platform businesses is that they see what succeeds on their platforms and then enter the most profitable areas themselves, often decimating third parties in the process. Studies have identified several motivations for platform-owner entry beyond just value capture. Multiple studies have suggested that platforms opt to enter directly in order to improve quality, for example. And the effect of platform entry on complementors is mixed. Some studies found that platform entry can create positive spillover effects on third parties and increase their demand. However, a few other studies find that the impact of entry on complementors can be negative. Google’s introduction of flights into its search engine decreased clicks on other organic results, for example. Careful empirical analysis is needed before policy intervention.

  Keywords: platform-based markets; platform-owner entry; Market Platforms; Market Entry and Exit; Competition;

  Citation:

  Zhu, Feng. "When Tech Companies Compete on Their Own Platforms." Harvard Business Review (website) (June 21, 2019).  View Details

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