Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Matching Markets with Transfers

John William  Hatfield; Scott Duke Kominers

Article | ACM SIGecom Exchanges

Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Matching Markets with Transfers

by John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers

Abstract

This note surveys recent work in generalized matching theory, focusing on trading networks with transferable utility. In trading networks with a finite set of contractual opportunities, the substitutability of agents’ preferences is essential for the guaranteed existence of stable outcomes and the correspondence of stable outcomes with competitive equilibria. Closely analogous results hold when venture participation is continuously adjustable, but under a concavity condition on agents’ preferences which allows for some types of complementarity.

Keywords: matching; networks; joint ventures; stability; Competitive equilibrium; Core; efficiency; Economics; Theory;

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Hatfield, John William, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Matching Markets with Transfers." ACM SIGecom Exchanges 10, no. 3 (December 2011).

Working Paper | HBS Working Paper Series | 2020

Paying It Backward and Forward: Expanding Access to Convalescent Plasma Therapy Through Market Design

Scott Duke Kominers, Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez and M. Utku Ünver

COVID-19 convalescent plasma (CCP) therapy is currently a leading treatment for COVID-19. At present, there is a shortage of CCP relative to demand. We develop and analyze a model of centralized CCP allocation that incorporates both donation and distribution. In order to increase CCP supply, we introduce a mechanism that utilizes two incentive schemes, respectively based on principles of “paying it backward" and “paying it forward." Under the first scheme, CCP donors obtain treatment vouchers that can be transferred to patients of their choosing. Under the latter scheme, patients obtain priority for CCP therapy in exchange for a future pledge to donate CCP if possible. We show that in steady-state, both principles generally increase overall treatment rates for all patients—not just those who are voucher-prioritized or pledged to donate. Our results also hold under certain conditions if a fraction of CCP is reserved for patients who participate in clinical trials. Finally, we examine the implications of pooling blood types on the efficiency and equity of CCP distribution.

Keywords: COVID-19; convalescent plasma; vouchers; Health Pandemics; Health Care and Treatment; Resource Allocation; Market Design;

Citation:

Kominers, Scott Duke, Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez, and M. Utku Ünver. "Paying It Backward and Forward: Expanding Access to Convalescent Plasma Therapy Through Market Design." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 20-116, May 2020. (NBER Working Paper Series, No. 27143, May 2020.) View Details

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Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Matching Markets with Transfers

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