Skip to Main Content
HBS Home
  • About
  • Academic Programs
  • Alumni
  • Faculty & Research
  • Baker Library
  • Giving
  • Harvard Business Review
  • Initiatives
  • News
  • Recruit
  • Map / Directions
Faculty & Research
  • Faculty
  • Research
  • Featured Topics
  • Academic Units
  • …→
  • Harvard Business School→
  • Faculty & Research→
Publications
Publications
  • 2018
  • Working Paper
  • HBS Working Paper Series

Bundling Incentives in (Many-to-Many) Matching with Contracts

By: Jonathan Ma and Scott Duke Kominers
  • Format:Print
  • | Language:English
  • | Pages:19
ShareBar

Abstract

In many-to-many matching with contracts, the way in which contracts are specified can affect the set of stable equilibrium outcomes. Consequently, agents may be incentivized to modify the set of contracts upfront. We consider one simple way in which agents may do so: unilateral bundling, in which a single agent links multiple contracts with the same counterparty together. We show that essentially no stable matching mechanism eliminates incentives for unilateral bundling. Moreover, we find that unilateral bundling can sometimes lead to Pareto improvement—and other times produces market power that makes one agent better off at the expense of others.

Keywords

Matching With Contracts; Contract Design; Bundling-proofness; Substitutability; Mathematical Methods

Citation

Ma, Jonathan, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Bundling Incentives in (Many-to-Many) Matching with Contracts." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 19-011, August 2018.
  • SSRN
  • Read Now

About The Author

Scott Duke Kominers

Entrepreneurial Management
→More Publications

More from the Authors

    • June 2025
    • Journal of Finance

    Collusion in Brokered Markets

    By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Richard Lowery
    • March 14, 2025
    • Harvard Crimson

    Harvard Students Should Ignore Calls to Boycott Israel Trek

    By: Jesse M. Fried, Paul A. Gompers, Scott Kominers and Mark C. Poznansky
    • March 2025
    • Faculty Research

    O2X: Optimizing to the X

    By: Scott Duke Kominers, Thomas Jennings and Maisie Wiltshire-Gordon
More from the Authors
  • Collusion in Brokered Markets By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Richard Lowery
  • Harvard Students Should Ignore Calls to Boycott Israel Trek By: Jesse M. Fried, Paul A. Gompers, Scott Kominers and Mark C. Poznansky
  • O2X: Optimizing to the X By: Scott Duke Kominers, Thomas Jennings and Maisie Wiltshire-Gordon
ǁ
Campus Map
Harvard Business School
Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
→Map & Directions
→More Contact Information
  • Make a Gift
  • Site Map
  • Jobs
  • Harvard University
  • Trademarks
  • Policies
  • Accessibility
  • Digital Accessibility
Copyright © President & Fellows of Harvard College.