Publications
Publications
- October 1990
- Journal of Financial Economics
Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders: Evidence on Changes in Corporate Ownership and Control When Firms Default
By: S. C. Gilson
Abstract
In 111 publicly traded firms that either file for bankruptcy or privately restructure their debt between 1979 and 1985, bank lenders frequently become major stockholders or appoint new directors. On average, only 46% of incumbent directors remain when bankruptcy or debt restructuring ends. Directors who resign hold significantly fewer seats on other boards following their departure. Common-stock ownership becomes more concentrated with large blockholders and less with corporate insiders. Few firms are acquired. Collectively, these results suggest that corporate default leads to significant changes in the ownership of firms' residual claims and in the allocation of rights to manage corporate resources.
Keywords
Citation
Gilson, S. C. "Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders: Evidence on Changes in Corporate Ownership and Control When Firms Default." Journal of Financial Economics 27, no. 2 (October 1990): 355–387.