Introduction to Life Settlements

Alexander  Braun; Lauren H. Cohen; Christopher J. Malloy; Jiahua  Xu

Background Note | HBS Case Collection | June 2018

Introduction to Life Settlements

by Alexander Braun, Lauren H. Cohen, Christopher J. Malloy and Jiahua Xu

Abstract

Life insurance is an asset owned by the majority of American adults (61%). Note that this 61% penetration rate is essentially at parity with home ownership (64%) and higher than that of 401(k) retirement account ownership (53%). Life settlements, or life insurance settlements, allow individuals to sell their life insurance policy in a secondary market. A life insurance policy is a tradable asset, for many individuals possibly the most valuable one in their portfolio after real estate and perhaps a retirement account. The fact that the policy is tradable, however, is hardly known to the general public. When surrendering a policy to the insurance carrier, the policyholder often incurs a substantial discount on its economic value. At the same time, the insurer keeps the difference between the policy’s economic value and its surrender value. By selling a policy in the secondary market, in contrast, it is common to achieve a price markedly above the surrender value. Hence, life settlements allow policyholders to capture a much larger, if not full, share of their contracts’ economic value. In this Industry Note, we lay out the basic structure of the market, the important players, and the basic economics. We also go into the potential ways to maximize returns in this market for both investors and policyholders.

Keywords: Insurance; Assets; Value; Markets; Investment Return;

Language: English

Format: Print

16 pages

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Citation:

Braun, Alexander, Lauren H. Cohen, Christopher J. Malloy, and Jiahua Xu. "Introduction to Life Settlements." Harvard Business School Background Note 218-127, June 2018.

Article | Journal of Financial Economics | October 2020

IQ from IP: Simplifying Search in Portfolio Choice

Huaizhi Chen, Lauren Cohen, Umit Gurun, Dong Lou, Christopher J. Malloy, Huaizhi Chen, Lauren Cohen, Umit Gurun, Dong Lou and Christopher J. Malloy

Using a novel database that tracks web traffic on the SEC’s EDGAR servers between 2004 and 2015, we show that mutual fund managers gather information on a very particular subset of firms and insiders, and their surveillance is very persistent over time. This tracking behavior has powerful implications for their portfolio choice and its information content. An institution that downloaded an insider-trading filing by a given firm last quarter increases its likelihood of downloading an insider-trading filing on the same firm by more than 41.3% this quarter. Moreover, the average tracked stock that an institution buys generates annualized alphas of between 9% to 18% relative to the purchase of an average non-tracked stock. We find that institutional managers tend to track members of the top management teams of firms (CEOs, CFOs, presidents, and board chairs) and tend to share educational and location-based commonalities with the specific insiders they choose to follow. Collectively, our results suggest that the information in tracked trades is important for fundamental firm value and is only revealed following the information-rich dual trading by insiders and linked institutions.

Keywords: tracked trades; Return Predictability; institutional trading; insider trading; Institutional Investing; Information; Investment Portfolio; Decisions; Management;

Citation:

Chen, Huaizhi, Lauren Cohen, Umit Gurun, Dong Lou, and Christopher J. Malloy. "IQ from IP: Simplifying Search in Portfolio Choice." Journal of Financial Economics 138, no. 1 (October 2020): 118–137. (Winner of the First Prize, Crowell Memorial Award for Best Paper in Quantitative Investments, PanAgora Asset Management, 2019.) View Details

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