Buying the Verdict

Lauren H. Cohen; Umit G. Gurun

Working Paper | 2018

Buying the Verdict

Abstract

We document evidence that firms systematically increase specialized, locally targeted advertising following the firm being taken to trial in that given location—precisely following initiation of the suit. In particular, we use legal actions brought against publicly traded firms over the 20-year sample period that progress to trial from 1995–2014. In terms of magnitude, the increase is sizable: targeted local advertising increases by 23% (t=4.39) following the suit. Moreover, firms concentrate these strategic increases in locations where the returns on their advertising dollars are largest: in smaller, more concentrated advertising markets where fewer competitor firms are advertising. They focus their advertisement spikes specifically toward jury trials and, in fact, specifically toward the most likely jury pool. Lastly, we document that these advertising spikes are associated with verdicts, increasing the probability of a favorable outcome.

Keywords: Lawsuits and Litigation; Advertising; Geographic Location; Outcome or Result;

Language: English

Format: Print

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Citation:

Cohen, Lauren H., and Umit G. Gurun. "Buying the Verdict." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 24542, April 2018.

Article | Management Science | December 2019

Patent Trolls: Evidence from Targeted Firms

Lauren Cohen, Umit Gurun and Scott Duke Kominers

We provide the first large-sample evidence on the behavior and impact of nonpracticing entities (NPEs) in the intellectual-property space. We find that, on average, NPEs appear to behave as opportunistic “patent trolls.” NPEs sue cash-rich firms and target cash in business segments unrelated to alleged infringement at essentially the same frequency as they target cash in segments related to alleged infringement. By contrast, cash is neither a key driver of intellectual-property lawsuits by practicing entities (e.g., IBM and Intel) nor of any other type of litigation against firms. We find further suggestive evidence of NPE opportunism: targeting of firms that have reduced ability to defend themselves, repeated assertions of lower-quality patents, increased assertion activity nearing patent expiration, and forum shopping. We find, moreover, that NPE litigation has a real negative impact on innovation at targeted firms: firms substantially reduce their innovative activity after settling with NPEs (or losing to them in court). Meanwhile, we neither find any markers of significant NPE pass-through to end innovators nor of a positive impact of NPEs on innovation in the industries in which they are most prevalent.

Keywords: Patent trolls; patents; innovation; Patents; Lawsuits and Litigation; Ethics; Innovation and Invention;

Citation:

Cohen, Lauren, Umit Gurun, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Patent Trolls: Evidence from Targeted Firms." Management Science 65, no. 12 (December 2019): 5461–5486. (Cited in the United States Federal Trade Commission Report on Patent Assertion Entities, 2016.) View Details

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We provide evidence that mutual fund managers misclassify their holdings, and that these misclassifications have a real and significant impact on investor capital flows. In particular, we provide the first systematic study of bond funds’ reported asset profiles to Morningstar against their actual portfolios. Many funds report more investment grade assets than are actually held in their portfolios, making these funds appear significantly less risky. This results in pervasive misclassifications across the universe of US fixed income mutual funds by Morningstar, who relies on these reported holdings. The problem is widespread- resulting in about 30% of funds being misclassified with safer profiles, when compared against their actual, publicly reported holdings. “Misclassified funds” – i.e., those that hold risky bonds, but claim to hold safer bonds – outperform the actual low-risk funds in their peer groups. “Misclassified funds” therefore receive higher Morningstar Ratings (significantly more Morningstar Stars) and higher investor flows due to this perceived outperformance. However, when we correctly classify them based on their actual risk, these funds are mediocre performers. Misreporting is stronger following several quarters of large negative returns.

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Buying the Verdict

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