Disruptive Innovation: An Intellectual History and Directions for Future Research

Clayton M. Christensen; Rory  McDonald; Elizabeth J.  Altman; Jonathan E.  Palmer

Article | Journal of Management Studies | November 2018

Disruptive Innovation: An Intellectual History and Directions for Future Research

by Clayton M. Christensen, Rory McDonald, Elizabeth J. Altman and Jonathan E. Palmer

Abstract

The concept of disruptive innovation has gained considerable currency among practitioners despite widespread misunderstanding of its core principles. Similarly, foundational research on disruption has elicited frequent citation and vibrant debate in academic circles, but subsequent empirical research has rarely engaged with its key theoretical arguments. This inconsistent reception warrants a thoughtful evaluation of research on disruptive innovation within management and strategy. We trace the theory’s intellectual history, noting how its core principles have been clarified by anomaly-seeking research. We also trace the theory’s evolution from a technology-change framework—essentially descriptive and relatively limited in scope—to a more broadly explanatory causal theory of innovation and competitive response. This assessment reveals that our understanding of the phenomenon of disruption has changed as the theory has developed. To reinvigorate academic interest in disruptive innovation, we propose several underexplored topics—response strategies, performance trajectories, and innovation metrics—to guide future research.

Keywords: disruptive innovation; innovation metrics; competitive strategy; systemic industries; technology trajectories; Disruptive Innovation; Theory; History; Competitive Strategy; Research;

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Citation:

Christensen, Clayton M., Rory McDonald, Elizabeth J. Altman, and Jonathan E. Palmer. "Disruptive Innovation: An Intellectual History and Directions for Future Research." Special Issue on Managing in the Age of Disruptions. Journal of Management Studies 55, no. 7 (November 2018): 1043–1078.

Five years on from the 2008 financial crisis, Goldman Sachs remained wounded. Revenues at the global investment bank had stagnated below pre-crisis levels, and the firm had yet to rebound from a substantial decline in securities-trading revenues. Marcus by Goldman Sachs was one response—an effort that operated as a start-up but was sponsored by senior Goldman executives—to grow the firm’s revenues by entering consumer banking with digital-only offerings. The moved marked a dramatic cultural as well as product shift: the 150 year-old institution historically served only businesses and the wealthiest of individuals. In 2016, Marcus launched unsecured personal loans for the mass market; it rolled out high-yield deposits in 2017 and a credit card in partnership with Apple in 2019. By autumn of that year, Marcus had $5 billion in loans outstanding and $55 billion in deposits. It also faced a dilemma—ceaseless and rapid expansion had strained its people and infrastructure, yet Goldman expected Marcus to generate $1 billion in revenues in 2020. What now was the better bet, to pause to allow performance to catch up with growth, or to seize the additional opportunities that beckoned for Marcus to diversify into consumer finance products?

Article | Organization Science | November–December 2019

Pivoting Isn't Enough? Managing Strategic Reorientation in New Ventures

Rory McDonald and Cheng Gao

New ventures often experience deviations from their plans that oblige them to reorient in pursuit of better fit between their evolving products and their target customers. Yet research is largely silent on how managers explain such changes and justify their ventures in the wake of fundamental redirections in strategy. Ventures initially attain legitimacy and amass resources on the strength of aims that audiences find compelling; later, those early claims can complicate course corrections. To shed light on how ventures manage strategic reorientations, we conducted an inductive, comparative-case of software-based financial advisors. The ventures pursued parallel reorientations and produced comparable end products, but diverged conspicuously in managing audiences during transitions. Our process model, inspired by these differences, proposes a sequence of stratagems that may enable entrepreneurs to alter strategy while portraying faithfulness to enduring aims. Our theoretical framework posits that for ventures, reorientation without penalty may depend on how they anticipate, justify, and stage changes to various audiences.

Keywords: strategic reorientation; technology entrepreneurship; innovation; product development processes; organizational adaptation; qualitative methods (general); Entrepreneurship; Technology; Organizational Change and Adaptation; Strategy; Innovation and Invention; Product Development; Communication Strategy;

Citation:

McDonald, Rory, and Cheng Gao. "Pivoting Isn't Enough? Managing Strategic Reorientation in New Ventures." Organization Science 30, no. 6 (November–December 2019): 1289–1318. View Details

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This note focuses on the development of the drone industry in recent years and provides insights on the drone technology, regulations, applications, market size, top players, and ecosystem. This note was written in conjunction with the case study “Parrot: Navigating the Nascent Drone Industry” (HBS No. 619-085).

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Disruptive Innovation: An Intellectual History and Directions for Future Research

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