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  • Summer 2019
  • Article
  • Contemporary Accounting Research

The Political Influence of Voters' Interests on SEC Enforcement

By: Jonas Heese
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Abstract

I examine whether political influence as a response to voters’ interest in employment levels is reflected in the enforcement actions of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). I find that large employers are less likely to experience SEC enforcement actions. Next, I examine whether variations in politicians’ sensitivity to employment levels result in variations in enforcement against large employers. I find that large employers are less likely to face enforcement actions during presidential elections if they are based in politically important states. Large employers also face fewer enforcement actions if they are based in high-unemployment states during elections of senators who serve on SEC oversight committees. Large employers based in high-unemployment districts enjoy lower enforcement if their congressmen serve on SEC oversight committees. The findings suggest that voters’ interests are reflected in SEC enforcement.

Keywords

SEC Enforcement; Government Preferences; Voters' Interests; Political Influence; Employment; Public Opinion; Government Administration; Governance Compliance; Political Elections

Citation

Heese, Jonas. "The Political Influence of Voters' Interests on SEC Enforcement." Contemporary Accounting Research 36, no. 2 (Summer 2019): 869–903.
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About The Author

Jonas Heese

Accounting and Management
→More Publications

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