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• Article | Bloomberg Opinion

  Making Auctions Work in Practice Is Worth a Nobel

  Scott Duke Kominers

  Citation:

  Kominers, Scott Duke. "Making Auctions Work in Practice Is Worth a Nobel." Bloomberg Opinion (October 12, 2020).  View Details

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• Article | Bloomberg Opinion

  CDC's Virus Messaging Is Too Complicated to Trust

  Scott Duke Kominers

  Citation:

  Kominers, Scott Duke. "CDC's Virus Messaging Is Too Complicated to Trust." Bloomberg Opinion (October 1, 2020).  View Details

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• Article | Journal of Political Economy | October 2020

  Collusion in Markets with Syndication

  John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Richard Lowery and Jordan M. Barry

  Markets for IPOs and debt issuances are syndicated, in the sense that a bidder who wins a contract may invite losing bidders to join a syndicate that together fulfills the contract. We show that in markets with syndication, standard intuitions from industrial organization can be reversed: Collusion may become easier as market concentration falls, and market entry may in fact facilitate collusion. In particular, price collusion can be sustained by a strategy in which firms refuse to join the syndicate of any firm that deviates from the collusive price. Our results thus can rationalize the apparently contradictory empirical facts that the market for IPO underwriting exhibits seemingly collusive pricing despite its low level of market concentration.

  Keywords: collusion; antitrust; IPO underwriting; Syndication; ＂Repeated games＂; Markets;

  Citation:

  Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, Richard Lowery, and Jordan M. Barry. "Collusion in Markets with Syndication." Journal of Political Economy 128, no. 10 (October 2020).  View Details

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