Why Compliance Programs Fail

Hui  Chen; Eugene  Soltes

Article | Harvard Business Review

Why Compliance Programs Fail: And How to Fix Them

Abstract

Firms spend millions of dollars annually on whistle-blower hotlines, training, and other efforts to ensure adherence to laws, regulations, and company policies. Yet malfeasance remains entrenched in the corporate world. Why? Too many firms treat compliance as a box-checking exercise, making employees sit through training and attest that they understand the rules, but failing to assess the effectiveness of their compliance programs, or doing so with faulty metrics. The authors explain how we reached this sorry state—and how we can remedy it. Firms should start by linking compliance initiatives more closely to specific objectives: preventing misconduct, detecting it, or aligning policies with laws and regulations. Then, using careful model design and some creativity, firms can develop better metrics to measure what’s working and what isn’t.

Keywords: Governance Compliance; Programs; Employees; Training; Performance Effectiveness; Measurement and Metrics;

Format: Print

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Citation:

Chen, Hui, and Eugene Soltes. "Why Compliance Programs Fail: And How to Fix Them." Harvard Business Review 96, no. 2 (March–April 2018): 116–125.

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Why Compliance Programs Fail: And How to Fix Them

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