Financial Repression in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis

Bo  Becker; Victoria  Ivashina

Article | Review of Finance | February 2018

Financial Repression in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis

Abstract

By the end of 2013, the share of government debt held by the domestic banking sectors of Eurozone countries was more than twice its 2007 level. We show that this type of increasing reliance on the domestic banking sector for absorbing government bonds generates a crowding out of corporate lending. For a given domestic firm, new debt is less likely to be a loan—i.e., the loan supply contracts—when local banks have purchased more domestic sovereign debt and when that debt is risky (as measured by CDS spreads). These effects are most pronounced in the period following the second Greek bailout in early 2010.

Keywords: Credit Cycles; Sovereign debt; Financial Repression; Sovereign Finance; Borrowing and Debt; Credit; Europe;

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Citation:

Becker, Bo, and Victoria Ivashina. "Financial Repression in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis." Review of Finance 22, no. 1 (February 2018): 83–115.

Using information on the sales of debt claims for 132 U.S. Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, we show that large trade creditors’ decisions to sell receivables of a distressed company in bankruptcy are predictive of lower recovery rates, and that in such cases these creditors sell ahead of less informed suppliers and other creditors. This result is especially pronounced for more opaque distressed firms, when trade creditors’ information advantage is likely largest. This evidence shows that suppliers that extend significant amounts of trade credit hold private information about their trade partners. Trade creditors who are geographically closer or in similar industries tend to lend the most, suggesting that these are two channels through which suppliers hold an information advantage.

Foreign banks’ lending to firms in emerging market economies (EMEs) is large and denominated predominantly in U.S. dollars. This creates a direct connection between U.S. monetary policy and EME credit cycles. We estimate that over a typical U.S. monetary easing cycle, EME borrowers experience a 32-percentage-point greater increase in the volume of loans issued by foreign banks than do borrowers from developed markets, with a similarly large effect upon reversal of the U.S. monetary policy stance. This result is robust across different geographic regions and industries, and holds for U.S. and non-U.S. lenders, including those with little direct exposure to the U.S. economy. Local EME lenders do not offset the foreign bank capital flows; thus, U.S. monetary policy affects credit conditions for EME firms. We show that the spillover is stronger in higher-yielding and more financially open markets, and for firms with a higher reliance on foreign bank credit.

Supplement | HBS Case Collection | September 2017

Actera Group: Investing in Mars Cinema Group (A)

Victoria Ivashina and Eren Kuzucu

In summer of 2010, Murat Çavuşoğlu (HBS MBA 1994) led private equity firm Actera Group’s investment in Mars Cinema Group (Mars), the leading movie exhibitor in Turkey. Immediately after acquiring Mars and merging it with the second larger player in the market, AFM, Çavuşoğlu focused on institutionalizing and implementing value creation work streams in Mars. While transforming an entrepreneurial company into an institutionalized firm, Çavuşoğlu established adjacent businesses such as movie advertising and ticket sales. The most recent step in transforming Mars was to establish a movie distribution arm, which would help the company to monitor and manage the seasonal cycles, enhance the appeal for investors in the exit, and improve the valuation. However, while Çavuşoğlu was laying out the plans for his next move with movie distribution in 2014, Turkey’s Council of State, the highest administrative court in the country, had decided to cancel the approval for the merger of Mars and AFM, putting all of Actera’s efforts on Mars at risk. Should Çavuşoğlu push the stop button for distribution? If Çavuşoğlu decided to move forward with distribution, should he do it now or wait until the process with Turkey’s judiciary and regulatory authorities cleared out?

Keywords: Private Equity; Value Creation; Transformation; Valuation; Entertainment and Recreation Industry; Motion Pictures and Video Industry; Turkey;

Citation:

Ivashina, Victoria, and Eren Kuzucu. "Actera Group: Investing in Mars Cinema Group (A)." Harvard Business School Spreadsheet Supplement 218-705, September 2017. View Details

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Financial Repression in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis

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