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  • Games and Economic Behavior

Strategy-Proofness of Worker-Optimal Matching with Continuously Transferable Utility

By: Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers and Ross Rheingans-Yoo
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Abstract

We give a direct proof of one-sided strategy-proofness for worker-firm matching under continuously transferable utility. A new “Lone Wolf” theorem (Jagadeesan et al., 2017) for settings with transferable utility allows us to adapt the method of proving one-sided strategy-proofness that is typically used in settings with discrete transfers.

Keywords

Matching; Strategy-proofness; Lone Wolf Theorem; Rural Hospitals Theorem; Mechanism Design; Marketplace Matching

Citation

Jagadeesan, Ravi, Scott Duke Kominers, and Ross Rheingans-Yoo. "Strategy-Proofness of Worker-Optimal Matching with Continuously Transferable Utility." Games and Economic Behavior 108 (March 2018): 287–294.

About The Author

Scott Duke Kominers

Entrepreneurial Management
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