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  • September 2016
  • Article
  • Management Science

Disproportional Control Rights and the Bonding Role of Debt

By: Aiyesha Dey, Valeri Nikolaev and Xue Wang
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Abstract

We examine the governance role of debt in the context of U.S.-based dual class ownership structures. We hypothesize that the use of debt alleviates the conflict between shareholder classes by balancing the power of controlling insiders. We document that dual class firms have higher leverage and a greater propensity to issue private debt; they also more frequently use cash sweeps and performance-based covenants. Dual class firms with greater agency conflicts and a greater need to access the capital market appear to rely more extensively on debt. These findings are consistent with controlling insiders bonding against the agency costs associated with dual class ownership. The governance role of debt is further corroborated by the valuation effect of debt for dual class companies. Private debt issuances trigger greater positive market reactions to the inferior dual class stock in relation to both the superior dual class stock and a matched sample of single class firms. Further, leverage attenuates the previously documented adverse effect of dual class status on Tobin’s q. Taken together, our analyses suggest that dual class firms use debt as a complementary governance mechanism.

Keywords

Dual Class; Private Debt; Debt Covenants; Bonding Mechanisms; Ownership Type; Capital Structure; Borrowing and Debt

Citation

Dey, Aiyesha, Valeri Nikolaev, and Xue Wang. "Disproportional Control Rights and the Bonding Role of Debt." Management Science 62, no. 9 (September 2016): 2581–2614.
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About The Author

Aiyesha Dey

Accounting and Management
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