Corporate Governance Reform and Executive Incentives: Implications for Investments and Risk-Taking

Daniel  Cohen; Aiyesha  Dey; Thomas  Lys

Article | Contemporary Accounting Research | Winter 2013

Corporate Governance Reform and Executive Incentives: Implications for Investments and Risk-Taking

by Daniel Cohen, Aiyesha Dey and Thomas Lys

Abstract

We investigate the mechanism through which the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) was associated with changes in corporate investment strategies. We document that the passage of the governance regulations in SOX was followed by a significant decline in pay‐performance sensitivity (Delta) and incentives to take risk (Vega) in CEOs' compensation contracts. These changes in compensation contracts are related to a decline in investments, including research and development expenditures, capital investments and acquisitions. Moreover, consistent with the rules in SOX directly affecting CEOs' incentives to take risk, we document that the decline in investments exceeds the amount that would be expected from changes in compensation packages alone. Finally, we also find evidence that the changes in investments are related to lower operating performances of firms, suggesting that these changes were costly to investors. Our evidence speaks to the debate on how corporate governance regulation interacts with firms' and managers' incentives, and ultimately affects corporate operating and investment strategies. Our study suggests that one indirect cost of such regulations in SOX is the significant reductions in corporate risk‐taking activities in the post‐SOX period. The changes in investments were in part due to changes in executive compensation contracts and in part related to increased executives' personal costs of engaging in risky activities.

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Cohen, Daniel, Aiyesha Dey, and Thomas Lys. "Corporate Governance Reform and Executive Incentives: Implications for Investments and Risk-Taking." Contemporary Accounting Research 30, no. 4 (Winter 2013): 1296–1332.

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Corporate Governance Reform and Executive Incentives: Implications for Investments and Risk-Taking

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