Budgeting, Psychological Contracts, and Budgetary Misreporting

Susanna  Gallani; Ranjani  Krishnan; Eric J. Marinich; Michael D. Shields

Article | Management Science | Forthcoming

Budgeting, Psychological Contracts, and Budgetary Misreporting

by Susanna Gallani, Ranjani Krishnan, Eric J. Marinich and Michael D. Shields

Abstract

This study examines the effect of psychological contract breach on budgetary misreporting. Psychological contracts are mental models or schemas that govern how employees understand their exchange relationships with their employers. Psychological contract breach leads to feelings of violation and can occur even when employees’ economic contracts are fulfilled. We study the effects of psychological contract breach on three common types of employee participation in budgeting that differ in the degree of employees’ influence over their approved budgets. These include affirmative budgeting (full influence), consultative budgeting (moderate influence), and authoritative budgeting (low influence). When organizations communicate that employees will be involved in budgeting, employees develop psychological contracts of affirmative budgeting. If employees subsequently experience authoritative or consultative budgeting, their psychological contracts are breached. Employees who experience psychological contract breach seek redress through budgetary misreporting. Experimental results indicate that psychological contract breach partially mediates the relation between budgeting type and budgetary misreporting. Results also indicate asymmetry in the effects of psychological contract breach versus repair. Effects of breach on budgetary misreporting persist even after the breach no longer occurs.

Keywords: Budgeting; psychological contracts; misreporting; Budgets and Budgeting; Employees; Trust;

Format: Print

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Citation:

Gallani, Susanna, Ranjani Krishnan, Eric J. Marinich, and Michael D. Shields. "Budgeting, Psychological Contracts, and Budgetary Misreporting." Management Science (forthcoming).

Using detailed information on Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) assessments of firms’ compensation practices, we examine whether these assessments identify poor compensation practices as measured by subsequent performance. While prior research provides consistent evidence of an association between shareholder voting outcomes and ISS recommendations, the evidence is mixed over whether their recommendations convey information about poor compensation policies. We find that ISS “Against” recommendations are associated with worse future accounting performance, consistent with ISS being able to detect suboptimal compensation packages. However, workload compression has an effect, as we find that the relation between assessments and future performance is stronger during off-season (for firms with non-December fiscal year end).

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Budgeting, Psychological Contracts, and Budgetary Misreporting

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