More from the Author

• Article | Review of Corporate Finance Studies | September 2019

  Contingent Capital Trigger Effects: Evidence from Liability Management Exercises

  Boris Vallée

  This paper investigates the so called liability management exercises by European banks, which bear comparable effects to triggering contingent capital. I first explore the determinants of these exercises. I then study market reactions to these operations as well as banks' economic performance following them. Debtors positively receive these exercises, while stockholders discriminate according to the terms of the operation. Moreover, banks implementing liability management exercises exhibit higher economic performance than the ones that do not. These findings point towards contingent capital offering an effective solution to the dilemma of bank capital regulation.

  Keywords: contingent capital; financial distress; regulatory capital; Financial Institutions; Legal Liability; Management; Banking Industry; Europe;

  Citation:

  Vallée, Boris. "Contingent Capital Trigger Effects: Evidence from Liability Management Exercises." Review of Corporate Finance Studies 8, no. 2 (September 2019): 235–259.  View Details

  CiteView DetailsFind at Harvard Read Now

  Related

• Working Paper | 2019

  Employment Effects of Alleviating Financing Frictions: Worker-level Evidence from a Loan Guarantee Program

  Boris Vallee, Julien Sauvagnat, Thorsten Martin and Jean-Noel Barrot

  Keywords: Labor; France;

  Citation:

  Vallee, Boris, Julien Sauvagnat, Thorsten Martin, and Jean-Noel Barrot. "Employment Effects of Alleviating Financing Frictions: Worker-level Evidence from a Loan Guarantee Program." Working Paper, July 2019.  View Details

  CiteView Details Read Now

  Related

• Article | Review of Financial Studies | May 2019

  Marketplace Lending: A New Banking Paradigm?

  Boris Vallée and Yao Zeng

  Marketplace lending relies on large-scale loan screening by investors, a major deviation from the traditional banking paradigm. Theoretically, participation of sophisticated investors in marketplace lending improves screening outcomes but also creates adverse selection. In maximizing loan volume, the platform trades of these two forces by choosing intermediate levels of platform pre-screening and information provision to investors. We use novel investor-level data to test these predictions. We empirically show that more sophisticated investors screen loans differently and systematically outperform less sophisticated investors. However, the outperformance shrinks when the platform reduces information provision to investors, consistent with platforms managing adverse selection.

  Keywords: marketplace lending; Screening; sophisticated investors; Adverse selection; Financing and Loans; Performance; Information;

  Citation:

  Vallée, Boris, and Yao Zeng. "Marketplace Lending: A New Banking Paradigm?" Review of Financial Studies 32, no. 5 (May 2019): 1939–1982.  View Details

  CiteView DetailsFind at Harvard

  Related