Come Together: Firm Boundaries and Delegation

Laura  Alfaro; Nick  Bloom; Paola  Conconi; Harald  Fadinger; Patrick  Legros; Andrew F. Newman; Raffaella  Sadun; John  Van Reenen

Working Paper | HBS Working Paper Series | 2018

Come Together: Firm Boundaries and Delegation

by Laura Alfaro, Nick Bloom, Paola Conconi, Harald Fadinger, Patrick Legros, Andrew F. Newman, Raffaella Sadun and John Van Reenen

Abstract

Little is known theoretically, and even less empirically, about the relationship between firm boundaries and the allocation of decision rights within firms. We develop a model in which firms choose which suppliers to integrate and whether to delegate decisions to integrated suppliers. We test the predictions of the model using a novel dataset that combines measures of vertical integration and delegation for a large set of firms from many countries and industries. In line with the model’s predictions, we obtain three main results: (i) integration and delegation co-vary positively; (ii) producers are more likely to integrate suppliers in input sectors with greater productivity variation (as the option value of integration is greater); and (iii) producers are more likely to integrate suppliers of more important inputs and to delegate decisions to them.

Keywords: Vertical Integration; delegation; real options; supply assurance; Vertical Integration; Decision Choices and Conditions; Boundaries;

Language: English

Format: Print

59 pages

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Citation:

Alfaro, Laura, Nick Bloom, Paola Conconi, Harald Fadinger, Patrick Legros, Andrew F. Newman, Raffaella Sadun, and John Van Reenen. "Come Together: Firm Boundaries and Delegation." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 18-051, December 2017. (Revised May 2018.)

Article | American Economic Journal: Economic Policy | May 2018

Selection and Market Reallocation: Productivity Gains from Multinational Production

Laura Alfaro and Maggie X. Chen

Assessing the productivity gains from multinational production has been a vital topic of economic research and policy debate. Positive aggregate productivity gains are often attributed to within-firm productivity improvement; however, an alternative, less emphasized explanation is between-firm selection and market reallocation, whereby competition from multinationals leads to factor reallocation and the survival of only the most productive domestic firms. We investigate the roles of the two different mechanisms in determining the aggregate productivity gains by exploring their distinct predictions on the distributions of domestic firms: within-firm productivity improvement shifts the productivity and revenue distributions rightward while between-firm selection and market reallocation raise the left truncation of the distributions and shift revenue leftward. Using a rich cross-country firm-level panel dataset, we find significant evidence of both mechanisms, but between-firm selection and market reallocation accounts for the majority of aggregate productivity gains, suggesting that ignoring this channel could lead to substantial bias in understanding the nature of gains from multinational production.

Keywords: Productivity gains; multinational production; selection; Market Reallocation; and within-firm productivity; Multinational Firms and Management; Production; Performance Productivity; Competition; Mathematical Methods;

Citation:

Alfaro, Laura, and Maggie X. Chen. "Selection and Market Reallocation: Productivity Gains from Multinational Production." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 10, no. 2 (May 2018): 1–38. (Also NBER Working Paper w18207. See Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 12–111, 2015 for longer version.) View Details

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We present evidence on the labor supply of CEOs and on whether family and professional CEOs differ on this dimension. We do so through a new survey instrument that allows us to codify CEOs’ diaries in a detailed and comparable fashion and to build a bottom-up measure of CEO labor supply. The comparison of 1,114 family and professional CEOs reveals that family CEOs work 9% fewer hours relative to professional CEOs. Hours worked are positively correlated with firm performance, and differences between family and non-family CEOs account for approximately 18% of the performance gap between family and non-family firms. We investigate the sources of the differences in CEO labor supply across governance types by exploiting firm and industry heterogeneity and quasi-exogenous meteorological and sport events. The evidence suggests that family CEOs value—or can pursue—leisure activities relatively more than professional CEOs.

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Come Together: Firm Boundaries and Delegation

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