Reinventing Best Buy

John R. Wells; Gabriel  Ellsworth

Teaching Note | HBS Case Collection | November 2017

Reinventing Best Buy

by John R. Wells and Gabriel Ellsworth

Abstract

Teaching Note for HBS No. 716-455. On March 1, 2017, Best Buy Company, Inc., North America’s largest retailer of consumer electronics and appliances, announced a third year of comparable-store sales increases and a 20.8% increase in domestic comparable online sales. These results were in marked contrast to four years of declining comparable-store sales from 2010 through 2013. The stock price rose 17% in March, and on April 20, 2017, it surpassed $50 for the first time since January 2008. When CEO Hubert Joly took over in September 2012, Best Buy was losing share to Amazon.com, which was encouraging consumers to view products at Best Buy and other physical stores and then buy them for a lower price online, a practice known as “showrooming.” Undaunted, Joly had encouraged the practice, convinced that it presented an opportunity to sell to customers as long as Best Buy’s prices were competitive. Joly had committed the company to a multi-channel strategy in North America and exited struggling international operations. Operating margins had increased as a result, but growth was still proving elusive. In early 2017, Joly announced that his “Renew Blue” turnaround effort was complete and that he was now intent on creating the New Blue. Would the new strategy be enough to stop Amazon’s advances?

Keywords: Best Buy; Hubert Joly; Renew Blue; showrooming; webrooming; e-commerce; E-Commerce strategy; online retail; multichannel retailing; omnichannel; marketplaces; turnaround; consumer electronics; consumer electronics accessories; appliances; stores-within-stores; store experience; store size; store pickup; store management; delivery; delivery models; Amazon; Amazon.com; Pricing strategy; Business Subsidiaries; Business Units; Business Growth and Maturation; Business Model; For-Profit Firms; Customer Focus and Relationships; Customer Satisfaction; Entertainment; Film Entertainment; Games, Gaming, and Gambling; Music Entertainment; Television Entertainment; Theater Entertainment; Price; Profit; Revenue; Geographic Scope; Multinational Firms and Management; Business History; Cost; Selection and Staffing; Reports; Technological Innovation; Job Cuts and Outsourcing; Human Capital; Leading Change; Business or Company Management; Goals and Objectives; Growth and Development; Growth and Development Strategy; Management Teams; Brands and Branding; Product Marketing; Consumer Behavior; Demand and Consumers; Media; Distribution; Order Taking and Fulfillment; Distribution Channels; Infrastructure; Product; Service Delivery; Service Operations; Organizational Change and Adaptation; Public Ownership; Problems and Challenges; Programs; Groups and Teams; Sales; Salesforce Management; Strategy; Adaptation; Business Strategy; Competition; Competitive Advantage; Competitive Strategy; Corporate Strategy; Expansion; Technology; Hardware; Information Technology; Internet; Mobile Technology; Online Technology; Search Technology; Software; Web; Web Sites; Wireless Technology; Resource Allocation; Computer Industry; Electronics Industry; Entertainment and Recreation Industry; Information Technology Industry; Retail Industry; Service Industry; Technology Industry; Telecommunications Industry; Video Game Industry; United States; Minnesota; Minneapolis; Saint Paul; St. Paul;

Language: English

Format: Print

17 pages

Purchase

Citation:

Wells, John R., and Gabriel Ellsworth. "Reinventing Best Buy." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 718-442, November 2017.

Case | HBS Case Collection | May 2019

State of Charge: The Massachusetts Energy Storage Initiative

John R. Wells and Benjamin Weinstock

In early 2017, Judith Judson (Harvard Business School MBA, 2000), Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Energy Resources (DOER), was reflecting on the results of the initiative she had led to identify the contribution advanced electricity storage could make to electricity generation and distribution in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The study was the first major output from the $10 million Energy Storage Initiative (ESI) launched by Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker’s administration in May 2015. The advanced simulation techniques employed in the study indicated that over a ten-year period, the optimal deployment of storage capacity would cut the cost of electricity for consumers in the Commonwealth by $230 million per year, deliver $110 million in annual revenues for storage providers, and reduce CO2 emissions by 100,000 tons a year, the equivalent of taking 22,000 cars off the road. Moreover, neighboring states would benefit from $250 million in lowered wholesale prices. To deliver these benefits, 1.77 GWh of advanced storage would be required across the grid, costing between $970 million and $1.35 billion. Incorporating the perspectives of a wide body of stakeholders (from utilities to municipalities to generators), the study wound up recommending a suite of policies that would facilitate the installation of 600 MWh of storage capacity by 2025, representing about six minutes of the state’s daily electricity consumption and delivering $800 million in benefits to ratepayers. It would also make the Commonwealth a leader in advanced storage technology and deliver substantial greenhouse gas reductions. At the end of 2015, according to figures from the Department of Energy, Massachusetts ranked 23rd in the United States in energy storage deployment, well behind the leader, Arizona, with nearly 300 MWh, and Texas, with over 150 MWh. However, with advances in storage technology, California promised to become the leader and had plans for nearly 1 GWh of storage capacity over the next five years. The ESI was seeking input on how to spend the balance of its $10 million budget and whether to authorize an additional $10 million on proof-of-concept deployments of the technology. Commissioner Judson pondered. Was this aggressive enough? And where did advanced storage stand in the priorities for the energy future of the Commonwealth?

Keywords: energy storage; Energy Generation; Programs; Policy; Strategy; Energy Industry; Utilities Industry; Massachusetts;

Citation:

Wells, John R., and Benjamin Weinstock. "State of Charge: The Massachusetts Energy Storage Initiative." Harvard Business School Case 719-448, May 2019. View Details

Cite View Details Educators Purchase

Electric cars had long been championed by environmentalists as a superior solution to the internal combustion engine (ICE), but, despite large government incentives and strong pioneering efforts by a few automakers over the years, electric and hybrid cars and light trucks still accounted for less than 1% of total global production in 2016. However, events took a turn in 2017 and 2018, when many governments committed to banning ICE vehicles. In response, leading automakers announced plans to launch hundreds of electric vehicle models within five years. Early pioneer Tesla, which, in 2017, had built a stock market valuation exceeding that of General Motors (GM), despite only delivering 103,000 cars compared to GM’s 9 million, looked as if it were about to be engulfed by this new competition. But not all were convinced that electric cars would soon displace conventional ICE vehicles. It was not clear that the infrastructure was in place to charge all these electric vehicles. There were also questions concerning the electrical generating capacity to meet the new demand. Would battery prices fall enough to make mass-market demand a possibility? In low gasoline cost jurisdictions, such as the United States, the economics of owning an electric vehicle didn’t appear justified, unless subsidies were maintained indefinitely. In Europe, where gasoline taxes were high, the case for electric vehicles was stronger. But European governments depended on those taxes to meet their budget needs. Would a significant uptake of electric vehicles necessitate higher taxes on electricity? In 2018, electric cars were an expensive novelty for the rich subsidized by the poor. Would the sudden rush of new models change the balance?

On January 6, 2019, HelloSelf, a London-based “BrainTech” company, founded a year earlier by Charles Wells, soft launched. The proposition was simply to help its members “Be your Best Self.” The company provided its registered members with access to a clinical psychotherapist, a life coach, and an AI engine that personalized advice. The platform provided members with the ability to set goals, track progress, and discover new things about themselves. Throughout the previous nine months, over 500 people had registered interest in the proposition, price points had been tested, competitors analyzed, members and specialists interviewed, and wireframes developed, but there were several questions still crossing Wells’ mind. Did the subscription LifeCoach bot model combined with pay-as-you-go therapist sessions make sense? How could he attract an early cohort of users? How would HelloSelf interact with the broken mental health solutions in the UK? How quickly would the platform scale and learn to provide meaningful AI support for both therapists and the LifeCoach bot? And most importantly, would the platform deliver on the mission “to help everyone discover, understand and experience their Best Self”?

Faculty & Research

Reinventing Best Buy

Abstract

Citation:

About the Author

More from the Author