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• Teaching Note | HBS Case Collection | March 2020

  The Boss Has the Wrong Idea

  Katherine B. Coffman, Alison Wood Brooks, Judith A. Clair, Katherine Chen, Manuela Collis and Kathleen L. McGinn

  Teaching Note for HBS Nos. 920-023 and 920-024.

  Citation:

  Coffman, Katherine B., Alison Wood Brooks, Judith A. Clair, Katherine Chen, Manuela Collis, and Kathleen L. McGinn. "The Boss Has the Wrong Idea." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 920-053, March 2020.  View Details

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• Case | HBS Case Collection | March 2020

  Social Salary Setting at Spiber

  Ashley Whillans and John Beshears

  Can a “set your own salary” system boost employee happiness and motivation? Spiber made synthetic silk built from proteins mimicking the proteins found in spider silk, the world’s toughest known material by weight. Kazuhide Sekiyama and Junichi Sugahara established Spiber to create protein materials that would eventually compete effectively with petrochemical-based materials widely used in apparel, auto parts, and airplane components, among many other applications. From the beginning, they envisioned a team built on mutual respect and a common purpose. The executive team wanted the company’s compensation system to match the organization’s values. Thus, the company had implemented a unique salary-setting process designed to inspire autonomy and responsibility among employees: each employee retained the ultimate authority to choose his or her own salary. The members of the executive team were excited about the “set your own salary” system, but was it having the intended effect?

  Keywords: Compensation and Benefits; Motivation and Incentives; Happiness; Negotiation Tactics; Cross-Cultural and Cross-Border Issues; Biotechnology Industry; Japan; United States;

  Citation:

  Whillans, Ashley, and John Beshears. "Social Salary Setting at Spiber." Harvard Business School Case 920-050, March 2020.  View Details

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• Article | Journal of Political Economy | March 2020

  Knowing When to Ask: The Cost of Leaning-in

  Christine L. Exley, Muriel Niederle and Lise Vesterlund

  Women's reluctance to negotiate is often used to explain the gender wage gap, popularizing the push for women to “lean-in" and negotiate more. Examining an environment where women achieve positive profits when they choose to negotiate, we find that increased negotiations are not helpful. Women know when to ask: they enter negotiations resulting in positive profits and avoid negotiations resulting in negative profits. While the findings are similar for men, we find no evidence that men are more adept than women at knowing when to ask. Thus, our results caution against a greater push for women to negotiate.

  Keywords: negotiations; leaning-in; selection; Negotiation Participants; Negotiation Style; Gender;

  Citation:

  Exley, Christine L., Muriel Niederle, and Lise Vesterlund. "Knowing When to Ask: The Cost of Leaning-in." Journal of Political Economy 128, no. 3 (March 2020): 816–854.  View Details

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