The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct

Mark  Egan; Gregor  Matvos; Amit  Seru

Article | Journal of Political Economy | February 2019

The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct

by Mark Egan, Gregor Matvos and Amit Seru

Abstract

We construct a novel database containing the universe of financial advisers in the United States from 2005 to 2015, representing approximately 10% of employment of the finance and insurance sector. We provide the first large-scale study that documents the economy-wide extent of misconduct among financial advisers and the associated labor market consequences of misconduct. Seven percent of advisers have misconduct records, and this share reaches more than 15% at some of the largest advisory firms. Roughly one-third of advisers with misconduct are repeat offenders. Prior offenders are five times as likely to engage in new misconduct as the average financial adviser. Firms discipline misconduct—approximately half of financial advisers lose their jobs after misconduct. The labor market partially undoes firm-level discipline by rehiring such advisers. Firms that hire these advisers also have higher rates of prior misconduct themselves, suggesting "matching on misconduct." These firms are less desirable and offer lower compensation. We argue that heterogeneity in consumer sophistication could explain the prevalence and persistence of misconduct at such firms. Misconduct is concentrated at firms with retail customers and in counties with low education, elderly populations, and high incomes. Our findings are consistent with some firms "specializing" in misconduct and catering to unsophisticated consumers, while others use their clean reputation to attract sophisticated consumers.

Keywords: Financial Advisors; Brokers; consumer finance; Financial Misconduct and Fraud; FINRA; Financial Institutions; Crime and Corruption; Organizational Culture; Personal Finance; Financial Services Industry;

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Egan, Mark, Gregor Matvos, and Amit Seru. "The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct." Journal of Political Economy 127, no. 1 (February 2019): 233–295.

I study how brokers distort household investment decisions. Using a novel convertible bond dataset, I find that consumers often purchase dominated bonds—cheap and expensive versions of otherwise identical bonds coexist in the market. The empirical evidence suggests that broker incentives are responsible for the inferior investments, as brokers earn a 1.12 percentage point higher fee relative to the notional invested for selling the dominated bond on average. I develop and estimate a broker intermediated search model that rationalizes this behavior and quantifies the distortions in these markets. In the model, consumer search is endogenously directed according to the incentives of brokers, and brokers price discriminate based on a consumer's level of sophistication. The model estimates indicate that costly search is a key friction in retail financial markets, but the effects of search costs are compounded when brokers are incentivized to direct the search of consumers towards high fee inferior products.

Working Paper | HBS Working Paper Series | 2018

Arbitration with Uninformed Consumers

Mark Egan, Gregor Matvos and Amit Seru

We examine whether firms have an informational advantage in selecting arbitrators in consumer arbitration as well as the impact of the arbitrator selection process on outcomes. We collect data containing roughly 9,000 arbitration cases in securities arbitration. Securities disputes present a good laboratory: the selection mechanism is similar to other major arbitration forums; arbitration is mandatory for all disputes, eliminating selection concerns; and the parties choose arbitrators from a randomly generated list. We first document that some arbitrators are systematically industry friendly while others are consumer friendly. Firms appear to utilize this information in the arbitrator selection process. Despite a randomly generated list of potential arbitrators, industry friendly arbitrators are 40% more likely to be selected than their consumer friendly counterparts. Better informed firms and consumers choose more favorable arbitrators. We develop and calibrate a model of arbitrator selection in which, like the current process, both the informed firms and uninformed consumers have control over the selection process. Arbitrators compete against each other for the attention of claimants and respondents. The model allows us to interpret our empirical facts in equilibrium and to quantify the effects of changes to the current arbitrator selection process on consumer outcomes. Competition between arbitrators exacerbates the informational advantage of firms in equilibrium resulting in all arbitrators slanting towards being industry friendly. Evidence suggests that limiting the respondents' and claimants' inputs over the arbitrator selection process could significantly improve outcomes for consumers.

Keywords: Arbitration; Financial Advisers; Financial Advisors; Brokers; consumer finance; Financial Misconduct; Personal Finance; Conflict and Resolution; Information; Fairness;

Citation:

Egan, Mark, Gregor Matvos, and Amit Seru. "Arbitration with Uninformed Consumers." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 19-046, October 2018. (NBER Working Paper Series, No. 25150, October 2018.) View Details

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We examine gender differences in misconduct punishment in the financial advisory industry. We find evidence of a "gender punishment gap": following an incident of misconduct, female advisers are 20% more likely to lose their jobs and 30% less likely to find new jobs relative to male advisers. Females face harsher outcomes despite engaging in misconduct that is 20% less costly and having a substantially lower propensity towards repeat offenses. The gender punishment gap in hiring and firing dissipates at firms with a greater percentage of female managers at the firm or local branch level. The gender punishment gap is not driven by gender differences in occupation (type of job, firm, market, or financial products handled), productivity, misconduct, or recidivism. We extend our analysis to explore the differential treatment of ethnic minorities and find similar patterns of "in-group" tolerance. Our evidence is inconsistent with a simple Bayesian model and suggests instead that managers are more forgiving of missteps among members of their own gender/ethnic group.

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The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct

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