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Chapter | Entrepreneurship, Innovation, and Platforms | 2017

Innovation Policies

by Ramana Nanda and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf

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Abstract

Past work has shown that failure tolerance by principals has the potential to stimulate innovation, but has not examined how this affects which projects principals will start. We demonstrate that failure tolerance has an equilibrium price – in terms of an investor’s required share of equity – that increases in the level of radical innovation. Financiers with investment strategies that tolerate early failure will endogenously choose to fund less radical innovations, while the most radical innovations (for whom the price of failure tolerance is too high) can only be started by investors who are not failure tolerant. Since policies to stimulate innovation must often be set before specific investments in innovative projects are made, this creates a trade-off between a policy that encourages experimentation ex post and the one that funds experimental projects ex ante. In equilibrium, it is possible that all competing financiers choose to offer failure tolerant contracts to attract entrepreneurs, leaving no capital to fund the most radical, experimental projects in the economy. The impact of different innovation policies can help to explain who finances radical innovations, and when and where radical innovation occurs.

Keywords: innovation; venture capital; Investing; abandonment option; failure tolerance; Innovation and Invention; Venture Capital; Attitudes; Investment; Failure;

Format: Print SSRNFind at HarvardPurchase

Citation:

Nanda, Ramana, and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf. "Innovation Policies." In Entrepreneurship, Innovation, and Platforms. Vol. 37, edited by Jeffrey Furman, Annabelle Gawer, Brian Silverman, and Scott Stern, 37–80. Advances in Strategic Management. Emerald Publishing Limited, 2017.

About the Author

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Ramana Nanda
Sarofim-Rock Professor of Business Administration (Leave of Absence)
Entrepreneurial Management

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More from the Author

  • Case | HBS Case Collection | October 2019 (Revised October 2019)

    NewView Capital and Venture Capital Secondaries

    Shai Benjamin Bernstein, Ramana Nanda and Allison Ciechanover

    While still a general partner at Silicon Valley-based New Enterprise Associates (NEA), Ravi Viswanathan considered the challenges presented by evolving market dynamics in the venture capital space. Startups were staying private longer, which led to limited partners thirsty for liquidity and venture capital funds managing overloaded portfolios. Viswanathan and the senior leaders of NEA orchestrated the purchase of 31 NEA unrealized portfolio companies by the newly created $1.35 billion NewView Capital spinout that he would head. This secondary transaction provided liquidity to NEA’s limited partners and reallocated NEA partners’ time to shepherd other portfolio companies, while at the same time allowing NewView Capital to reap gains from future exits from a portfolio of diverse, high-quality growth stage technology companies. Now, as he prepares to raise Fund II, Viswanathan acknowledges that the unique circumstances that enabled the launch of Fund I would not be replicable, and he must consider alternative strategies to pursue next. Should he continue to focus on secondary transactions, focus on direct investments, or some combination of the two?

    Keywords: Venture Capital; Capital Markets; Private Equity; Strategy;

    Citation:

    Bernstein, Shai Benjamin, Ramana Nanda, and Allison Ciechanover. "NewView Capital and Venture Capital Secondaries." Harvard Business School Case 820-038, October 2019. (Revised October 2019.)  View Details
    CiteView DetailsEducators Related
  • Chapter | The Oxford Handbook of Entrepreneurship and Collaboration | 2019

    Coordination Frictions in Venture Capital Syndicates

    Ramana Nanda and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf

    An extensive literature on venture capital has studied asymmetric information and agency problems between investors and entrepreneurs, examining how separating entrepreneurs from the investor can create frictions that might inhibit the funding of good projects. It has largely abstracted away from the fact that a startup typically does not have just one investor but rather several VCs that come together in a syndicate to finance a venture. In this chapter, we therefore argue for an expansion of the standard perspective to also include frictions within VC syndicates. Put differently, what are the frictions that arise from the fact that there is not just one investor for each venture but several investors with different incentives, objectives, and cash flow rights who nevertheless need to collaborate to help make the venture a success? We outline the ways in which these coordination frictions manifest themselves, describe the underlying drivers, and document several contractual solutions used by VCs to mitigate their effects. We believe that this broader perspective provides several promising avenues for future research.

    Keywords: Syndication; frictions; Venture Capital; Networks; Entrepreneurship;

    Citation:

    Nanda, Ramana, and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf. "Coordination Frictions in Venture Capital Syndicates." In The Oxford Handbook of Entrepreneurship and Collaboration, edited by Jeffrey J. Reuer, Sharon Matusik, and Jessica F. Jones. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019.  View Details
    CiteView DetailsFind at HarvardPurchase Related
  • Working Paper | HBS Working Paper Series | 2019

    Infrastructure and Finance: Evidence from India's GQ Highway Network

    Abhiman Das, Ejaz Ghani, Arti Grover, William R. Kerr and Ramana Nanda

    We use the construction of India's Golden Quadrangle (GQ) central highway network, together with comprehensive loan data drawn from the Reserve Bank of India, to investigate the interaction between infrastructure development and financial sector depth. We identify a disproportionate increase in loan count and average loan size in districts along the GQ highway network using stringent specifications with industry and district fixed effects. Our results hold in straight-line IV frameworks and are not present in “placebo tests” with another highway that was planned to be upgraded at the same time as GQ but subsequently delayed. Importantly, however, results are concentrated in districts with stronger initial financial development, suggesting that while financing does respond to large infrastructure investments and help spur real economic outcomes, initial financial sector development might play an important role in determining where real activity will grow.

    Keywords: Infrastructure; Financing and Loans; India;

    Citation:

    Das, Abhiman, Ejaz Ghani, Arti Grover, William R. Kerr, and Ramana Nanda. "Infrastructure and Finance: Evidence from India's GQ Highway Network." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 19-121, June 2019.  View Details
    CiteView DetailsSSRN Read Now Related
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