2020
Working Paper
HBS Working Paper Series

Sex Selection and the Indian Marriage Market

Format:Print
| Language:English
| Pages:62

Abstract

I consider the widespread phenomenon of sex ratios skewed by parental preference. Edlund (1999) proposes that if parents prefer sons and permit only women to marry up in social class, sexes will segregate by wealth in equilibrium. Using data on 30,000 Indian children, I show that parents indeed consider the marital prospects of their children when sex selecting. This leads to the average marriageable woman being poorer than her male counterpart, a compositional shift which generates asymmetry in marriage matches and bargaining power. The results underscore the importance of incorporating compositional shifts into standard models of scarcity in marriage markets.

Keywords

Sex Selection; Marriage Market; Bargaining Power; Gender; Technology; Household; Outcome or Result; India

Citation

Hussam, Reshmaan N. "Sex Selection and the Indian Marriage Market." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 18-029, September 2017. (Revised October 2020.)