Publications
Publications
- 2020
- HBS Working Paper Series
Sex Selection and the Indian Marriage Market
Abstract
I consider the widespread phenomenon of sex ratios skewed by parental preference. Edlund (1999) proposes that if parents prefer sons and permit only women to marry up in social class, sexes will segregate by wealth in equilibrium. Using data on 30,000 Indian children, I show that parents indeed consider the marital prospects of their children when sex selecting. This leads to the average marriageable woman being poorer than her male counterpart, a compositional shift which generates asymmetry in marriage matches and bargaining power. The results underscore the importance of incorporating compositional shifts into standard models of scarcity in marriage markets.
Keywords
Sex Selection; Marriage Market; Bargaining Power; Gender; Information Technology; Household; Outcome or Result; India
Citation
Hussam, Reshmaan N. "Sex Selection and the Indian Marriage Market." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 18-029, September 2017. (Revised October 2020.)