Publications
Publications
- 2020
- HBS Working Paper Series
Sex Selection and the Indian Marriage Market
Abstract
This paper considers the widespread phenomenon of sex ratios skewed by parental preference. It tests the seminal theory of Edlund (1999), who proposes that if parents prefer sons over daughters and permit poor women (but not men) to marry up in social class, the sexes will segregate by wealth in equilibrium. That is, wealthy parents will select for sons, while poor families, knowing their sons stand little chance in the marriage market, refrain from sex selection or select for girls. Using data on 30,000 Indian children, I show that parents indeed consider the marital prospects of their children when sex selecting: in markets with many wealthy suitors, poor parents select substantially fewer for sons. This leads to the average woman in the market being poorer than the average man, a compositional shift, which yields greater asymmetry in marriage matches and lower female bargaining power. The result stands in contrast to implications of the popular model of scarcity on bargaining outcomes in marriage.
Keywords
Sex Selection; Son Preference; Marriage Market; Bargaining Power; Gender; Technology; Household; Outcome Or Result; India
Citation
Hussam, Reshmaan N. "Sex Selection and the Indian Marriage Market." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 18-029, September 2017. (Revised February 2020.)
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