Pros vs Joes: Agent Pricing Behavior in the Sharing Economy

Jun  Li; Antonio  Moreno; Dennis J. Zhang

Working Paper | 2016

Pros vs Joes: Agent Pricing Behavior in the Sharing Economy

by Jun Li, Antonio Moreno and Dennis J. Zhang

Abstract

One of the major differences between markets that follow a “sharing economy” paradigm and traditional two-sided markets is that the supply side in the sharing economy often includes individual nonprofessional decision makers, in addition to firms and professional agents. Using a data set of prices and availability of listings on Airbnb, we find that there exist substantial differences in the operational and financial performance of professional and nonprofessional hosts. In particular, properties managed by professional hosts earn 16.9% more in daily revenue, have 15.5% higher occupancy rates, and are 13.6% less likely to exit the market compared with properties owned by nonprofessional hosts, while controlling for property and market characteristics. We demonstrate that these performance differences between professionals and nonprofessionals can be partly explained by pricing inefficiencies. Specifically, we provide empirical evidence that nonprofessional hosts are less likely to offer different rates across stay dates based on the underlying demand patterns, such as those created by major holidays and conventions. We develop a parsimonious model to analyze the implications of having two such different host groups for a profit-maximizing platform operator and for a social planner. While a profit-maximizing platform operator should charge lower prices to nonprofessional hosts, a social planner would charge the same prices to professionals and nonprofessionals.

Keywords: two-sided market; sharing economy; Behavioral economics; revenue management; hospitality; Two-Sided Platforms; Price; Behavior; Experience and Expertise;

Language: English

Format: Print

SSRN

Citation:

Li, Jun, Antonio Moreno, and Dennis J. Zhang. "Pros vs Joes: Agent Pricing Behavior in the Sharing Economy." Michigan Ross School of Business Working Paper, No. 1298, August 2016.

Spoilage, expiration, damage due to employee/customer handling, employee theft, and customer shoplifting usually are not reflected in inventory records. As a result, records often report phantom inventory, i.e., units of good not available for sale. We derive an optimal polynomial-time algorithm for the auditing and replenishment problem with phantom inventory, under the assumption that inventory is known immediately after replenishment. Moreover, we numerically show that a projected service-level threshold policy performs comparably to the optimal.

In 2010, amidst the growth of ecommerce and the emergence of new, purely online, fashion players, Zara launched its first online store, Zara.com. Since then, Zara’s online business had grown at a fast pace. By 2018, 12% of Inditex Group’s total sales came from the online channel. Since the inception of the first online store, Inditex leadership wanted its online and offline businesses to be integrated. However, the increase of online orders challenged some of its operations. Inditex was committed to the vision of becoming fully integrated, fully digital, and fully sustainable by 2020. How could stores continue to be relevant in a world with increasing presence of online touchpoints? What should the store portfolio look like in the medium term? How should Zara use and advance the integrated model going forward? What other challenges and opportunities would arise with the increase of online sales?

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Pros vs Joes: Agent Pricing Behavior in the Sharing Economy

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