Altoona State Investment Board & Bain Capital Fund XI

Josh   Lerner; Ted  Berk

Case | HBS Case Collection | August 2017

Altoona State Investment Board & Bain Capital Fund XI

Abstract

Considers the decision faced by state pension fund manager Rod Calhoun as he decides whether to invest $200 million in Bain Capital's eleventh global buyout fund: Bain Capital Fund XI. For the fund, Bain was offering its limited partners a choice among three different fee structures: first, a "conventional" fee structure of a 1.5% management fee with 20% carried interest and a 7% preferred rate of return; second, a 1% management fee with 30% carried interest and a 7% preferred rate of return; or third, a 0.5% management fee, 30% carried interest, and a 0% preferred rate of return. Should Calhoun invest in Bain? If he should, which fee structure should Calhoun choose?

Keywords: Capital; design; entrepreneurship; Equity method; finance; Leveraged Buyout; management; management buyout; private equity; venture capital; Capital; Design; Entrepreneurship; Finance; Leveraged Buyouts; Management; Private Equity; Venture Capital; Banking Industry; Massachusetts;

Language: English

Format: Print

14 pages

Educators Purchase

Citation:

Lerner, Josh, and Ted Berk. "Altoona State Investment Board & Bain Capital Fund XI." Harvard Business School Case 218-022, August 2017.

Ayash and Rastad (2017) express several concerns about our 2014 analysis of private equity buyouts. We welcome their interest in our work but think their criticisms are off the mark. Some of their claims reflect a misunderstanding of the Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) and its underlying data inputs. Because the LBD has emerged as a major laboratory for empirical studies in economics and finance, we use this opportunity to reiterate and clarify some of its important features. In a similar spirit, we elaborate on steps taken to develop our large sample of private equity buyouts. We also address Ayash and Rastad’s remarks about the empirical design of our establishment-level analysis, our methods for distinguishing between leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and other private equity transactions, bankruptcy rates among firms acquired in LBOs, their assertion that we undercount large public-to-private LBOs, and other matters.

This paper examines investments made by 13 angel groups across 21 countries. We compare applicants just above and below the funding cutoff and find that these angel investors have a positive impact on the growth, performance, and survival of firms as well as their follow-on fundraising. The positive impact of angel financing is independent of the level of venture activity and entrepreneur friendliness in the country. However, we find that the development stage and maturity of startups that apply for angel funding (and those that are ultimately funded) is inversely correlated with the entrepreneurship friendliness of the country, which may reflect self-censoring by very early stage firms that do not expect to receive funding in these environments.

Faculty & Research

Altoona State Investment Board & Bain Capital Fund XI

Abstract

Citation:

About the Authors

More from these Authors