Publications
Publications
- May 2017
- American Economic Review
Stable and Strategy-Proof Matching with Flexible Allotments
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Westkamp
Abstract
We introduce a framework of matching with flexible allotments that can be used to model firms with cross-division hiring restrictions. Our framework also allows us to nest some prior models of matching with distributional constraints. Building upon our recent work on observable substitutability, we show that multi-division choice functions with flexible allotments enable stable and strategy-proof matching; these results illustrate the value of clearly mapping when stable and strategy-proof matching is possible.
Keywords
Citation
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Westkamp. "Stable and Strategy-Proof Matching with Flexible Allotments." American Economic Review 107, no. 5 (May 2017): 214–219.