Publications
Publications
- September 2017
- Journal of Financial Economics
Reexamining Staggered Boards and Shareholder Value
By: Charles C.Y. Wang and Alma Cohen
Abstract
Cohen and Wang (2013) (CW2013) provide evidence consistent with market participants perceiving staggered boards to be value reducing. Amihud and Stoyanov (2016) (AS2016) contests these findings, reporting some specifications under which the results are not statistically significant. We show that the results retain their significance under a wide array of robustness tests that address the concerns expressed by AS2016. Our empirical findings reinforce the conclusions of CW2013.
Keywords
Corporate Governance; Staggered Boards; Takeover Defense; Antitakeover Provision; Firm Value; Delaware; Airgas; Governing And Advisory Boards; Corporate Governance; Value
Citation
Wang, Charles C.Y., and Alma Cohen. "Reexamining Staggered Boards and Shareholder Value." Journal of Financial Economics 125, no. 3 (September 2017): 637–647.
About The Author
