Should Governments Invest More in Nudging?

Shlomo  Benartzi; John  Beshears; Katherine L. Milkman; Cass R. Sunstein; Richard H. Thaler; Maya  Shankar; Will  Tucker-Ray; William J. Congdon; Steven  Galing

Article | Psychological Science | August 2017

Should Governments Invest More in Nudging?

by Shlomo Benartzi, John Beshears, Katherine L. Milkman, Cass R. Sunstein, Richard H. Thaler, Maya Shankar, Will Tucker-Ray, William J. Congdon and Steven Galing

Abstract

Governments are increasingly adopting behavioral science techniques for changing individual behavior in pursuit of policy objectives. The types of “nudge” interventions that governments are now adopting alter people’s decisions without coercion or significant changes to economic incentives. We calculated ratios of impact to cost for nudge interventions and for traditional policy tools, such as tax incentives and other financial inducements, and we found that nudge interventions often compare favorably with traditional interventions. We conclude that nudging is a valuable approach that should be used more often in conjunction with traditional policies, but more calculations are needed to determine the relative effectiveness of nudging.

Keywords: nudge; nudge unit; choice architecture; behavioral science; Behavioral economics; savings; pension plan; education; college enrollment; energy; electricity usage; preventive health; influenza vaccination; flu shot; open materials; Behavior; Governance; Economics; Policy; Power and Influence;

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Citation:

Benartzi, Shlomo, John Beshears, Katherine L. Milkman, Cass R. Sunstein, Richard H. Thaler, Maya Shankar, Will Tucker-Ray, William J. Congdon, and Steven Galing. "Should Governments Invest More in Nudging?" Psychological Science 28, no. 8 (August 2017): 1041–1055.

Can a “set your own salary” system boost employee happiness and motivation? Spiber made synthetic silk built from proteins mimicking the proteins found in spider silk, the world’s toughest known material by weight. Kazuhide Sekiyama and Junichi Sugahara established Spiber to create protein materials that would eventually compete effectively with petrochemical-based materials widely used in apparel, auto parts, and airplane components, among many other applications. From the beginning, they envisioned a team built on mutual respect and a common purpose. The executive team wanted the company’s compensation system to match the organization’s values. Thus, the company had implemented a unique salary-setting process designed to inspire autonomy and responsibility among employees: each employee retained the ultimate authority to choose his or her own salary. The members of the executive team were excited about the “set your own salary” system, but was it having the intended effect?

Article | Journal of Public Economics | March 2020

Which Early Withdrawal Penalty Attracts the Most Deposits to a Commitment Savings Account?

John Beshears, James J. Choi, Christopher Harris, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian and Jung Sakong

Previous research has shown that some people voluntarily use commitment contracts that restrict their own choice sets. We study how people divide money between two accounts: a liquid account that permits unrestricted withdrawals and a commitment account that is randomly assigned in a between-subject design to have either a 10% early withdrawal penalty, or a 20% early withdrawal penalty, or not to allow early withdrawals at all (i.e., an infinite penalty). When the liquid account and the commitment account pay the same interest rate, higher early withdrawal penalties attract more commitment account deposits. This pattern is predicted by the hypothesis that some participants are partially or fully sophisticated present-biased agents. Such agents perceive that higher penalties generate greater scope for commitment by disincentivizing (penalized) early withdrawals. The experiment also shows that when the commitment account pays a higher interest rate than the liquid account, the positive empirical slope relating penalties and commitment deposits is flattened, suggesting that naïve present-biased agents or agents with standard exponential discounting are also in our sample. Across all of our experimental treatments, higher early withdrawal penalties on the commitment account sometimes increase and never reduce allocations to the commitment account.

Keywords: quasi-hyperbolic discounting; present bias; sophistication; naiveté; commitment; Flexibility; savings; Contract Design; defined contribution retirement plan; 401 (k); IRA; Saving; Behavior; Contracts; Design; Interest Rates;

Citation:

Beshears, John, James J. Choi, Christopher Harris, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Jung Sakong. "Which Early Withdrawal Penalty Attracts the Most Deposits to a Commitment Savings Account?" Art. 104144. Journal of Public Economics 183 (March 2020). View Details

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Should Governments Invest More in Nudging?

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