Career Concerns of Banking Analysts

Joanne  Horton; George  Serafeim; Shan  Wu

Article | Journal of Accounting & Economics | April–May 2017

Career Concerns of Banking Analysts

by Joanne Horton, George Serafeim and Shan Wu

Abstract

We study how career concerns influence banking analysts' forecasts and how their forecasting behavior benefits both them and bank managers. We show that banking analysts issue early in the year relatively more optimistic and later in the year more pessimistic forecasts for banks that could be their future employers. This pattern is not observed when the same analysts forecast earnings of companies that are not likely to be their future employers. Moreover, we use the Global Settlement as an exogenous shock, which limited outside opportunities and therefore exacerbated career concerns, and show that this forecast pattern is more pronounced after the Settlement. Both analysts and bank executives benefit from this behavior. Analysts issuing more biased forecasts for potential future employers are more likely to face favorable career outcomes and bank executives appear to profit from the analysts' bias since the bias is associated with higher levels of insider trading. Our results highlight the bias created by asking analysts to rate their outside opportunities in the labor market.

Keywords: sell-side analysts; analyst forecasts; analysts; investment recommendations; Career advancement; career management; Labor Mobility; labor market; Prejudice and Bias; Personal Development and Career; Forecasting and Prediction; Investment Banking;

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Horton, Joanne, George Serafeim, and Shan Wu. "Career Concerns of Banking Analysts." Journal of Accounting & Economics 63, nos. 2-3 (April–May 2017): 231–252.

Analyzing data from approximately 1.5 million employees across 1,100 established public and private US companies, we find that the strength of employee beliefs about their firm’s purpose is lower in public companies. This difference is most pronounced within the salaried middle and hourly ranks, rather than senior executives. Among public companies, purpose becomes progressively lower with more concentrated shareholders, especially among firms with high hedge fund ownership. These patterns can be partly explained by differences in CEO backgrounds and compensation: public firms, particularly those with strong shareholders, choose outsider CEOs at higher rates and pay them more relative to their employees. Our analyses suggest that these results are not driven solely by sorting effects, but appear attributable in part to the impact that firm owners have on their employees. In summary, shareholders appear to influence the strength of corporate purpose deep within organizations via the leadership and corporate practices they enable at the top.

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Career Concerns of Banking Analysts

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