More from these Authors

• Working Paper | HBS Working Paper Series | 2020

  Predictable Financial Crises

  Robin Greenwood, Samuel G. Hanson, Andrei Shleifer, Jakob Ahm Sørensen, Robin Greenwood, Samuel G. Hanson, Andrei Shleifer and Jakob Ahm Sørensen

  Using historical data on post-war financial crises around the world, we show that crises are substantially predictable. The combination of rapid credit and asset price growth over the prior three years, whether in the nonfinancial business or the household sector, is associated with about a 40% probability of entering a financial crisis within the next three years. This compares with a roughly 7% probability in normal times, when neither credit nor asset price growth has been elevated. Our evidence cuts against the view that financial crises are unpredictable “bolts from the sky” and points toward the Kindleberger-Minsky view that crises are the byproduct of predictable, boom-bust credit cycles. The predictability we document favors macro-financial policies that “lean against the wind” of credit market booms.

  Keywords: Financial Crisis; Forecasting and Prediction; Mathematical Methods;

  Citation:

  Greenwood, Robin, Samuel G. Hanson, Andrei Shleifer, and Jakob Ahm Sørensen. "Predictable Financial Crises." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 20-130, June 2020.  View Details

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• Working Paper | HBS Working Paper Series | 2020

  Predictable Financial Crises

  Robin Greenwood, Samuel G. Hanson, Andrei Shleifer, Jakob Ahm Sørensen, Robin Greenwood, Samuel G. Hanson, Andrei Shleifer and Jakob Ahm Sørensen

  Using historical data on post-war financial crises around the world, we show that crises are substantially predictable. The combination of rapid credit and asset price growth over the prior three years, whether in the nonfinancial business or the household sector, is associated with about a 40% probability of entering a financial crisis within the next three years. This compares with a roughly 7% probability in normal times, when neither credit nor asset price growth has been elevated. Our evidence cuts against the view that financial crises are unpredictable “bolts from the sky” and points toward the Kindleberger-Minsky view that crises are the byproduct of predictable, boom-bust credit cycles. The predictability we document favors macro-financial policies that “lean against the wind” of credit market booms.

  Keywords: Financial Crisis; Forecasting and Prediction; Mathematical Methods;

  Citation:

  Greenwood, Robin, Samuel G. Hanson, Andrei Shleifer, and Jakob Ahm Sørensen. "Predictable Financial Crises." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 20-130, June 2020.  View Details

  CiteView Details Read Now

  Related

• Working Paper | 2020

  How Should U.S. Bank Regulators Respond to the COVID-19 Crisis?

  Michael Blank, Samuel G. Hanson, Jeremy C. Stein, Adi Sunderam, Michael Blank, Samuel G. Hanson, Jeremy C. Stein and Adi Sunderam

  Drawing on lessons from the 2007–2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and a simple conceptual framework, we examine the response of U.S. bank regulators to the COVID-19 pandemic. We argue that the current regulatory strategy of “watchful waiting”—the same strategy that was used during the early stages of the GFC—poses unnecessary risks to the financial system and broader U.S. economy. Instead, promoting an early recapitalization of the banking system, by stopping dividends and by encouraging new equity issues, would be a more prudent way to manage the vulnerabilities the pandemic has created. We close by suggesting additional measures that we believe regulators should take in both the short and long run.

  Keywords: COVID-19; bank regulation; recapitalization; Health Pandemics; Banks and Banking; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Strategy; Risk Management; United States;

  Citation:

  Blank, Michael, Samuel G. Hanson, Jeremy C. Stein, and Adi Sunderam. "How Should U.S. Bank Regulators Respond to the COVID-19 Crisis?" Hutchins Center Working Paper, No. 63, June 2020.  View Details

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