Prizes, Patents and the Search for Longitude

M. Diane  Burton; Tom  Nicholas

Article | Explorations in Economic History | April 2017

Prizes, Patents and the Search for Longitude

by M. Diane Burton and Tom Nicholas

Abstract

The 1714 Longitude Act created the Board of Longitude to administer a large monetary prize and progress payments for the precise determination of a ship’s longitude. However, the prize did not prohibit patenting. We use a new dataset of marine chronometer inventors to show that the propensity to patent was high. We argue that while the prize spurred entry by key inventors, and progress payments facilitated research investment in an area of significant social value, patents promoted disclosure. Our findings highlight the importance of complementarities between prize and patent-based incentives in the design of innovation inducement contests.

Keywords: Prizes; innovation; Patents; Innovation and Invention; Motivation and Incentives;

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Citation:

Burton, M. Diane, and Tom Nicholas. "Prizes, Patents and the Search for Longitude." Explorations in Economic History 64 (April 2017): 21–36.

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Prizes, Patents and the Search for Longitude

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