Publications
Publications
- February 2018
- Review of Finance
Financial Disclosure and Market Transparency with Costly Information Processing
By: Marco Di Maggio and Marco Pagano
Abstract
We study a model where some investors (“hedgers”) are bad at information processing, while others (“speculators”) have superior information-processing ability and trade purely to exploit it. The disclosure of financial information induces a trade externality: if speculators refrain from trading, hedgers do the same, depressing the asset price. Market transparency reinforces this mechanism, by making speculators’ trades more visible to hedgers. As a consequence, asset sellers will oppose both the disclosure of fundamentals and trading transparency. This is socially inefficient if a large fraction of market participants are speculators, and hedgers have low processing costs. But in these circumstances, forbidding hedgers’ access to the market may dominate mandatory disclosure.
Keywords
Financial Disclosure; Information Processing; Liquidity; Market Transparency; Rational Inattention; Information; Financial Liquidity; Knowledge Use and Leverage; Corporate Disclosure; Financial Markets; Investment
Citation
Di Maggio, Marco, and Marco Pagano. "Financial Disclosure and Market Transparency with Costly Information Processing." Review of Finance 22, no. 1 (February 2018): 117–153.
About The Author
