Publications
Publications
- Games and Economic Behavior
On the Correspondence of Contracts to Salaries in (Many-to-Many) Matching
Abstract
In this note, I extend the work of Echenique (2012) to show that a model of many-to-many matching with contracts may be embedded into a model of many-to-many matching with wage bargaining whenever (1) all agentsʼ preferences are substitutable and (2) the matching with contracts model is unitary, in the sense that every contractual relationship between a given firm–worker pair is specified in a single contract. Conversely, I show that unitarity is essentially necessary for the embedding result.
Keywords
Many-to-Many Matching; Stability; Substitutes; Contract Design; Unitarity; Market Design; Contracts; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability; Economics
Citation
Kominers, Scott Duke. "On the Correspondence of Contracts to Salaries in (Many-to-Many) Matching." Games and Economic Behavior 75, no. 2 (July 2012): 984–989.
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