Institutional Ownership and Corporate Tax Avoidance: New Evidence

Mozaffar N. Khan; Suraj  Srinivasan; Liang  Tan

Article | Accounting Review | March 2017

Institutional Ownership and Corporate Tax Avoidance: New Evidence

by Mozaffar N. Khan, Suraj Srinivasan and Liang Tan

Abstract

We provide new evidence on the agency theory of corporate tax avoidance (Slemrod, 2004; Crocker and Slemrod, 2005; Chen and Chu, 2005) by showing that increases in institutional ownership are associated with increases in tax avoidance. Using the Russell index reconstitution setting to isolate exogenous shocks to institutional ownership, as well as a regression discontinuity design that facilitates sharper identification of treatment effects, we find a significant and discontinuous increase in tax avoidance following Russell 2000 inclusion. The tax avoidance involves the use of tax shelters, and immediate benefits include higher profit margins and the likelihood of meeting or beating analyst expectations. Collectively the results shed light on the effect of increased ownership concentration on tax avoidance.

Keywords: tax avoidance; agency costs; institutional ownership; Private Ownership; Crime and Corruption; Taxation; Agency Theory;

Format: Print

SSRN Find at Harvard

Citation:

Khan, Mozaffar N., Suraj Srinivasan, and Liang Tan. "Institutional Ownership and Corporate Tax Avoidance: New Evidence." Accounting Review 92, no. 2 (March 2017): 101–122.

The case describes the efforts of hedge fund Paulson & Co to influence corporate governance and improve performance in the gold industry. In an innovative move, the hedge fund led the creation of the Shareholder Gold Council, a consortium of large investors in gold companies to push gold mining companies to adopt higher levels of corporate governance. The case describes the motivation and process that led to the creation of the SGC and the initial work of the SGC. The case also discusses the variety of techniques that Paulson & Co uses to press for better performance at gold mining companies such as buying majority ownership and pursuing activist proxy contests in addition to its work at the SGC. The case serves as a vehicle for students to discuss how investors can engage with companies to drive their desired corporate governance goals. In particular, the case develops the idea of collective action by investors and the opportunities and challenges in doing so.

This case explores a new board director who asks a detailed question about a footnote in the lengthy board packet distributed to directors by management. The case allows for discussion about the amount of information and level of detail provided by management, the level of preparation directors engage in prior to board meetings, and the appropriate strategic focus of the board. This case is part of a series of vignettes that capture different dilemmas faced by directors as they join boards of companies and understand the dynamics of the new boards that they join.

This case explores a new board director who wants more detail from the management team than his fellow directors are willing to press for. New board director Sam Pesca is frustrated that CFO Alex Marotta provides only a minimal two-page financial summary at board meetings, despite Pesca’s requests for more comprehensive information. The other directors object to pressing Marotta for more detail, and young CEO R.J. Oscott asks Pesca to refrain from pressing the CFO. This case is part of a series of vignettes that capture different dilemmas faced by directors as they join boards of companies and understand the dynamics of the new boards that they join.

Faculty & Research

Institutional Ownership and Corporate Tax Avoidance: New Evidence

Abstract

Citation:

About the Author

More from the Author