Publications
Publications
- 2020
- HBS Working Paper Series
On the Failure to Seek Beneficial Information: The Problem with Inconspicuous Incentives
By: Leslie K. John, Hayley Blunden, Katherine L. Milkman, Luca Foschini, Francesca Gino and Bradford Tuckfield
Abstract
Managers and policymakers regularly rely on incentives to encourage valued behaviors. While often successful, there are also notable and surprising examples of their ineffectiveness. Why? Perhaps they are not sufficiently conspicuous. In support of this account, in a large-scale field experiment and laboratory study, we show that even when incentives are transparently provided and easily trackable in real time, failing to make them conspicuous renders incentives ineffectual at shifting behavior. Further, we show that inconspicuous incentives are ineffective in part because people fail to seek information on how to improve their outcomes despite being informed that such information exists and even when it can be obtained at the mere click of button. Finally, we show that people fail to appreciate potential beneficiaries’ apparent lack of interest in obtaining incentive information, a result suggesting that purveyors of incentive programs may under-invest in promoting them.
Keywords
Citation
John, Leslie K., Hayley Blunden, Katherine L. Milkman, Luca Foschini, Francesca Gino, and Bradford Tuckfield. "On the Failure to Seek Beneficial Information: The Problem with Inconspicuous Incentives." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 16-090, February 2016. (Revised January 2020.)
About The Authors
