Publications
Publications
- 1997
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Incommensurable Values
By: Nien-he Hsieh
Abstract
Values, such as liberty and equality, are sometimes said to be incommensurable in the sense that their value cannot be reduced to a common measure. The possibility of value incommensurability is thought to raise deep questions about practical reason and rational choice as well as related questions concerning topics as diverse as akrasia, moral dilemmas, the plausibility of utilitarianism, and the foundations of liberalism. This entry outlines answers in the contemporary literature to these questions, starting with questions about the nature and possibility of value incommensurability.
Keywords
Citation
Hsieh, Nien-he. "Incommensurable Values." In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Stanford University, 1997. Electronic. (First published Mon Jul 23, 2007; substantive revision Wed Jul 14, 2021.)