Empty U.S. Roads Should Be Safer. They're Not.
Citation:
Kominers, Scott Duke. "Empty U.S. Roads Should Be Safer. They're Not." Bloomberg Opinion (June 3, 2020). View Details|
Working Paper 2014 Hidden Substitutes |
Abstract
In this paper, we show that preferences exhibiting some forms of complementarity in fact have an underlying substitutable structure. Specifically, we show that some preferences that are not substitutable in the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts become substitutable when an employer is allowed to sign multiple contracts with an individual worker. These substitutably completable preferences guarantee the existence of stable outcomes, even though stable outcomes are not guaranteed, in general, when complementarities are present. Our results imply the existence of a stable, strategy-proof mechanism for allocating workers with specialized skillsets; moreover, our results give new insight into the existing applications of matching with contracts to cadet–branch matching and the design of affirmative action programs.
Keywords: Many-to-One Matching; Many-to-Many Matching; stability; Substitutes; Matching with Contracts; Slot-Specific Priorities; Sherlock; Market Design; Contracts; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability;
Citation:
Hatfield, John William, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Hidden Substitutes." Working Paper, September 2014.
