Empirical Evidence on the Behavior and Impact of Patent Trolls: A Survey

Lauren  Cohen; Umit  Gurun; Scott Duke Kominers

Chapter | Patent Assertion Entities and Competition Policy | 2017

Empirical Evidence on the Behavior and Impact of Patent Trolls: A Survey

by Lauren Cohen, Umit Gurun and Scott Duke Kominers

Abstract

We survey the empirical literature on non-practicing entity (NPE) litigation behavior and its consequences. We document both aggregate trends and cross-sectional differences amongst various types of NPEs. Survey evidence illustrates a number of ways in which NPEs can potentially act opportunistically and indicates at least some instances and consequences of observed NPE opportunism. Large-sample empirical work has recently begun corroborating and amplifying the findings from survey evidence. NPEs on average behave as "patent trolls." Indeed, NPEs hold and frequently litigate patents that are likely to be at least partially invalidated; moreover, NPEs target cash irrespective of its relation to alleged infringement. Cash-targeting is neither the main driver of practicing entity (PE) intellectual property (IP) litigation, nor of non-IP litigation against publicly traded firms. The empirical evidence suggests, however, that not all NPEs exhibit trolling behavior—the cash-targeting observed in the data is primarily the behavior of large patent aggregators, rather than small inventors. NPE patent trolling has a real negative impact on targeted firms, without any increase in innovation, technology transfer, or other counterbalancing benefits measured thus far.

Keywords: Patent trolls; NPEs; PAEs; innovation; patents; Patents; Lawsuits and Litigation; Innovation and Invention;

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Citation:

Cohen, Lauren, Umit Gurun, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Empirical Evidence on the Behavior and Impact of Patent Trolls: A Survey." In Patent Assertion Entities and Competition Policy, edited by D. Daniel Sokol. Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Article | Journal of Finance | June 2020

Lazy Prices

Lauren Cohen, Christopher J. Malloy and Quoc Nguyen

We explore the implications of a subtle "default" choice that firms make in their regular reporting practices, namely that firms typically repeat what they most recently reported. Using the complete history of regular quarterly and annual filings by U.S. corporations from 1995 to 2014, we show that when firms make an active change in their reporting practices, this conveys an important signal about the firm. Changes to the language and construction of financial reports have strong implications for firms' future returns: a portfolio that shorts "changers" and buys "non-changers" earns up to 188 basis points per month (over 22% per year) in abnormal returns in the future. These reporting changes are concentrated in the management discussion (MD&A) section. Changes in language referring to the executive (CEO and CFO) team, or regarding litigation, are especially informative for future returns.

Keywords: information; default behavior; inertia; firms; annual reports; disclosure; Information; Business or Company Management; Behavior; Corporate Disclosure; Financial Reporting; United States;

Citation:

Cohen, Lauren, Christopher J. Malloy, and Quoc Nguyen. "Lazy Prices." Journal of Finance 75, no. 3 (June 2020): 1371–1415. (Winner of the First Prize, Chicago Quantitative Alliance Academic Paper Competition, 2016. Winner of the Jack Treynor Prize for superior work in the field of investment management and financial markets, sponsored by the Q-Group,The Institute for Quantitative Research in Finance, 2016. Winner of the Hillcrest Behavioral Finance Prize, 2016.) View Details

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COVID-19 convalescent plasma (CCP) therapy is currently a leading treatment for COVID-19. At present, there is a shortage of CCP relative to demand. We develop and analyze a model of centralized CCP allocation that incorporates both donation and distribution. In order to increase CCP supply, we introduce a mechanism that utilizes two incentive schemes, respectively based on principles of “paying it backward" and “paying it forward." Under the first scheme, CCP donors obtain treatment vouchers that can be transferred to patients of their choosing. Under the latter scheme, patients obtain priority for CCP therapy in exchange for a future pledge to donate CCP if possible. We show that in steady-state, both principles generally increase overall treatment rates for all patients—not just those who are voucher-prioritized or pledged to donate. Our results also hold under certain conditions if a fraction of CCP is reserved for patients who participate in clinical trials. Finally, we examine the implications of pooling blood types on the efficiency and equity of CCP distribution.

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Empirical Evidence on the Behavior and Impact of Patent Trolls: A Survey

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