Who Neglects Risk? Investor Experience and the Credit Boom

Sergey  Chernenko; Samuel Gregory Hanson; Adi   Sunderam

Article | Journal of Financial Economics | November 2016

Who Neglects Risk? Investor Experience and the Credit Boom

by Sergey Chernenko, Samuel Gregory Hanson and Adi Sunderam

Abstract

Many have argued that overoptimistic thinking on the part of lenders helps fuel credit booms. We use new microdata on mutual funds' holdings of securitizations to examine which investors are susceptible to such boom-time thinking. We show that firsthand experience plays a key role in shaping investors' beliefs. During the 2003–2007 mortgage boom, inexperienced fund managers loaded up on securitizations linked to nonprime mortgages, accumulating twice the holdings of more seasoned managers. Moreover, inexperienced managers who personally experienced severe or recent adverse investment outcomes behaved more like seasoned managers. Training and institutional memory can serve as partial substitutes for personal experience.

Keywords: Risk Management; Investment; Experience and Expertise;

Format: Print

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Citation:

Chernenko, Sergey, Samuel Gregory Hanson, and Adi Sunderam. "Who Neglects Risk? Investor Experience and the Credit Boom." Journal of Financial Economics 122, no. 2 (November 2016): 248–269. (Internet Appendix Here.)

Using historical data on post-war financial crises around the world, we show that crises are substantially predictable. The combination of rapid credit and asset price growth over the prior three years, whether in the nonfinancial business or the household sector, is associated with about a 40% probability of entering a financial crisis within the next three years. This compares with a roughly 7% probability in normal times, when neither credit nor asset price growth has been elevated. Our evidence cuts against the view that financial crises are unpredictable “bolts from the sky” and points toward the Kindleberger-Minsky view that crises are the byproduct of predictable, boom-bust credit cycles. The predictability we document favors macro-financial policies that “lean against the wind” of credit market booms.

Drawing on lessons from the 2007–2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and a simple conceptual framework, we examine the response of U.S. bank regulators to the COVID-19 pandemic. We argue that the current regulatory strategy of “watchful waiting”—the same strategy that was used during the early stages of the GFC—poses unnecessary risks to the financial system and broader U.S. economy. Instead, promoting an early recapitalization of the banking system, by stopping dividends and by encouraging new equity issues, would be a more prudent way to manage the vulnerabilities the pandemic has created. We close by suggesting additional measures that we believe regulators should take in both the short and long run.

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Who Neglects Risk? Investor Experience and the Credit Boom

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