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• Case | HBS Case Collection | October 2016 (Revised October 2017)

  Misaki Capital and Sangetsu Corporation

  Ian Gow, Charles C.Y. Wang, Naoko Jinjo and Nobuo Sato

  Japan’s corporate culture has traditionally prioritized the interests of stakeholders such as employees and suppliers over those of shareholders. After a decades-long economic slump, Japan’s government has begun efforts to improve corporate governance and firms' incentives to engage with shareholders. Misaki Capital was founded in 2013 with a strategy of constructively engaging with portfolio firms, providing operational and financial advice to management in order to improve shareholder value. This case asks students to consider the attractiveness of Japanese equities given recent reforms and to evaluate the investment approach of Misaki Capital.

  Keywords: activist investing; constructivist investing; Japan; corporate governance; valuation; stock screens; return on equity; Investment; Business and Stakeholder Relations; Corporate Governance; Financial Strategy; Business and Shareholder Relations; Japan;

  Citation:

  Gow, Ian, Charles C.Y. Wang, Naoko Jinjo, and Nobuo Sato. "Misaki Capital and Sangetsu Corporation." Harvard Business School Case 117-007, October 2016. (Revised October 2017.)  View Details

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• Case | HBS Case Collection | June 2017

  teamLab: “Ultra-technologist” Group

  Citation:

  Gow, Ian D., and Mayuka Yamazaki. "teamLab: “Ultra-technologist” Group." Harvard Business School Case 117-072, June 2017.  View Details

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• Working Paper | HBS Working Paper Series | 2016

  Managing Reputation: Evidence from Biographies of Corporate Directors

  Ian D. Gow, Aida Sijamic Wahid and Gwen Yu

  We examine how corporate directors manage reputation through disclosure choices in biographies in proxy statements filed with the SEC. Directors are more likely to withhold information about directorships at firms that experienced adverse events. Withholding such information is associated with more favorable stock price reactions at appointment and loss of fewer subsequent directorships. Nondisclosure of directorships is significantly reduced following changes to SEC rules, with the greatest change being for adverse-event directorships. These findings suggest that reputation concerns of corporate directors lead to strategic disclosure choices that have real consequences in both capital and labor markets.

  Keywords: Director monitoring; reputation; strategic disclosure; Management; Corporate Disclosure; Reputation;

  Citation:

  Gow, Ian D., Aida Sijamic Wahid, and Gwen Yu. "Managing Reputation: Evidence from Biographies of Corporate Directors." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 17-029, October 2016.  View Details

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